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Papuans confront Freeport 
During the past few months, the giant US 
mining corporation, Freeport-McMoran 
Copper & Gold Inc, has been the target of 
protest and opposition on a scale not seen 
before. Actions have occurred in several 
parts of West Papua as well as in Jakarta 
and other cities. Some groups are calling 
for the company to stop its operations 
while others are pressing for a re-
negotiation of the Contract of Work 
originally agreed with the Indonesian 
government in 1967. There are no sifns as 
yet that either of these demands wil be 
met. 
On the basis of the initial contract signed in 1967 (re-
negotiated in 1991 ), Freeport has been exploiting West 
Papua's copper and gold reserves, which rank among the 
largest in the world, for nearly 40 years. 
The people of West Papua have never been involved 
in any of the agreements with the company and have 
hardly benefited from its operations. On the contrary, they 
have been forced to surrender ancestral lands, and have 
suffered human rights abuses from the military in charge 
of security. Tailings spewed daily from the mine have 
caused immense environmental damage to Freeport's 
concession area of 230 square kilometres (90 square 
miles). 
The British mining giant, Rio Tinto, was formerly a 
shareholder in Freeport McMoran. It retains a joint 
venture interest, which in 2005 generated US$ 232 million 
of earnings for the company (see box on page 3) . 
The latest eruption of West Papuan anger with the 
company has been spurred by two recent events. Firstly, 
the publication on 27 December of a front page article in 
the New York Times called The Cost of Gold - The 
Hidden Payroll: Below a Mountain of Wealth, a River of 
Waste. This drew attention to the huge profits made by 
the company and to the massive sums paid to the military 
for security protection. [See TAPOL Bulletin, No 181, 
December 2005] 
Secondly, the forcible expulsion from the mining area 
in February of local people prospecting for gold in the 
waste left behind by the company. The ensuing clashes 
with the police forced the company to suspend operations 
for three days. 
These incidents have helped draw attention to the 
contrast between, on the one hand, a hugely profitable 
company last year paying over $1 billion to the 
Indonesian government (see box on page 3) and lining 
the pockets of its shareholders and, on the other hand, a 
desperately poor population who have had no say in the 
unbridled exploitation of what they rightfully see as their 
own natural resources . 
Last year, while the World Bank revealed 38 per cent 
of Papuans were living in poverty, Freeport McMoran paid 
its two top executives a fortune. The company's chairman, 
'Jim-Bob' Moffett, and its president and chief executive 
Richard Adkerson together cashed in stock options of 
more than $130 million in the previous six months, 
according to the US Securities and Exchange Commission. 
This came on top of compensation packages of $77.3 
million in 2005 . Adkerson "defended their 2005 
compensation packages as a reflection of 'an unusual 
year' during which the company's copper and gold 
production increased sharply. It was, he said, 'just a matter 
of personal financial prudence'". [The Financial Times, 11 
April 2006] 
Contents 
Papuans confront Freeport page 1 
Asylum seekers in Australia page 4 
Partition is unacceptable to Papuans page 5 
Timika ambush suspects await trial page 7 
Peace process still on track page 8 
Sharia law in Aceh page 1 O 
Reform of the military page 11 
West woos SBY page 15 
The truth is told page 16 
'Obrigado' page 19 
Workers' rights under renewed threat page 20 
Anti-pom bill stirs controversy page 23 
''~ST P~\PlL\ 
---------------------
Abepura fatalities 
Papuan anger over Freeport erupted first in Timika, the 
town near Tembagapura where the mining operations are 
based , and then , a few days later, in Jayapura, the capital 
of of West Papua. 
In Timika, on 14 March, angry crowds attacked the 
hotel where Freeport officials were staying and damaged 
the building though there were no casualties. Among 
those staying at the Hotel Sheraton were members of the 
Papuan People's Assembly (MRP), who were hoping to 
visit the mine as part of an investigation but were 
compelled by circumstances to abandon their mission. 
Two days later, in Abepura, about 20 kilomet res from 
Jayapura, clashes between Papuans and the security forces 
outside Cenderawasih University had fatal consequences. 
After members of Brimob, the notorious riot-control 
brigade of the Indonesian Police Force, had fai led to 
persuade students to remove a roadblock, they resorted to 
force. Stone-throwing students responded by cornering 
several members of Brimob. In the clashes which ensued , 
three policemen were ki lled. A fourth man, from the 
Indonesian air force, who happened to be in the campus 
complex, also died . The death toll later rose to five as a 
wounded police officers died in hospital. The air force 
officer was reportedly from air force intelliigence. 
An unknown number of civilians were also injured , 
includ ing children . A Papuan student, Dany Hisage, died 
as a resul t of grievous injuries inflicted on him in police 
custody. 
Arbitrary reprisals 
Following the killing of the Brimob officers, the police 
launched 'sweeping operations' (house-to-house searches 
and patrols searching the streets) in and around Jayapura 
during which a number of student dormitories were badly 
damaged. Vehicles were stopped and searched and 
Papuan passengers were dragged out, kicked and beaten . 
Students from the Central Highlands appeared to be 
targeted in revenge attacks reminiscent of those that took 
place in Abepura in December 2000 when three students 
were killed and dozens more were tortured in police 
custody [See 'Abepura killers escape justice' TAPOL 
Bulletin, no. 180, p. 16]. 
A total of 57 people, mostly students, were arrested. 
Hundreds of others fled to the surrounding hills to find 
sanctuary. By the end of March around 200 students were 
thought to be still in hiding without food or access to 
medical care. 
Two journalists' organisations, the ICTJ (Association of 
Television Journalists) and AJI (Alliance of Independence 
Journalists) issued a joint statement complaining that 
several of their members had been mal-treated by the 
security forces while they were covering the events as 
they unfolded, and demanded an apology and 
compensation from the police for equipment destroyed 
and for medical costs. 
Financial markets wor,ried 
The troubles surrounding Freeport have attracted much 
comment around the world . According to the leading 
financial news agency, Dow Jones, 'business circles are 
expressing concern over the effects of the mine's future 
on the t ight metals market as it churns out a massive 
9 ,000 ounces of gold and 1,000 tons of copper a day'. 
[Dow Jones, 17 March 2006) As for the government in 
Jakarta, the same report quotes President Susilo Bambang 
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Anti Freeport demonstration in Timika 
Yudhoyono as describing the demands for the company's 
operations to close down as being 'unrealistic' , adding 
that his government would study the company's 
community programmes 'to see if the funds could be 
distributed more evenly '. One of the President's reasons 
for refusing to close down the company was the 'harmful 
effect' it would have on the national economy. 
The President's reaction was pred ictable bearing in 
mind that the company is Indonesia's largest taxpayer. 
Faced with the escalating crisis, he ordered a team of top-
level officials to visit West Papua. They included Admiral 
Djoko Suyanto, the commander-in-chief of the Armed 
Forces, General Sutanto, the national chief of police, 
Syamsir Siregar, head of the state intelligence agency, BIN 
and Air Marshal Widodo, A.S., Minister Co-ordinator for 
Political and Security Affairs . 
Although Jakarta initially insisted that additional police 
would not be sent because those on the spot were 
deemed to be sufficient, within a week came an 
announcement that 600 additional Brimob troops would 
be sent to West Papua. The Brimob troops already in 
Jayapura had been withdrawn to barracks. 
Ban on foreign media still in place 
Five weeks before the protests against Freeport took 
place, Indonesia's Defence Minister, Juwono Sudarsono, 
the first non-military man to occupy the post since the 
1950s, defended restrictions on foreign media access to 
West Papua. He was quoted as saying that the presence 
of the foreign media, NGOs and churches 'might create 
conflict there by encouraging Papuans to campaign on 
issues of human rights. We feel that our unity and 
cohesion ar:e being threatened by the presence of foreign 
intrusion' . [Reuters, 6 February 2006) 
A report in the Australian daily The Age, suggested 
that a visit by one of its journalists to Jayapura was the 
first time a foreign journalist had been able to gain access 
for nearly two years. 
The fact that the statement about media access to 
West Papua was made not by the information and 
communications minister but by the defence minister only 
reinforces the suspicion that the decision to keep out 
prying foreign journalists is one taken by the military. With 
the foreign media and other foreigners kept largely at bay, 
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Demonstration outside Freeport offices in Jakarta 
the defence minister can hardly blame foreign intrusion 
for the protests against Freeport. 
UN genocide expert kept out 
The special adviser to the UN Secretary-General on the 
prevention of genocide, Juan Mendez, has said that West 
Papua is an area of concern in which the indigenous 
population is in danger of extinction [Voice of America, 
27 January 2006]. He expressed frustration that the 
Indonesian government is preventing human rights 
observers from monitoring the 'worrying' situation amid 
reports of abuses there. He said that the UN was willing 
to step in and mediate a solution to the long-running 
tensions. 
'It's very worrying and there's evidence about violence 
that has continued there since 1963. It's important that 
we look closely at the conflict now and make sure it's not 
getting out of hand. We certainly have it under our 
inquiry but it's hard to assess the situation on the ground 
to know what's going on in West Papua,' he said . 
Chris Ballard of the Australian National University in 
Canberra, who is recognised as one of Australia's foremost 
experts on West Papua is also being kept out. He said that 
he has not been able to visit West Papua since 2001. 
[Sydney Morning Herald, 1 March, 2006] 
TAPOL raises problem with President Yudhoyono 
In a letter to the Indonesian President sent on the day 
after the tragic events in Abepura, TAPOL called for the 
removal of arbitrary restrictions on access to West Papua 
for all journalists, whether Indonesian or foreign, for the 
immediate establishment of an independent commission 
to investigate the causes of the events in mid-March, for 
the commission to report within one month, for its 
findings to be made public, and for all those now under 
arrest to be allowed access to a lawyer and either charged 
or released. 
Fourteen to be charged 
Following the bloody incident in Abepura, 14 people are 
being held by the police as suspects. They include: Selpius 
Bobii who chairs the West Papua Referendum Front , 
Moses Totoba, a teacher, Ferry Pakage, a parking 
attendant, and Musa Asol, a security officer. The other 
suspects are all students: Benius Baker, Alex Wayangkaw, 
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Freeport and Rio 
Tinto at a glance 
Freeport signed its first Contract of Work with 
Indonesia in 1967. This was before the so-called Act 
of Free Choice in August 1969, which led to West 
Papua's incorporation into Indonesia. The contract was 
to explore and exploit the area of Mount Ertsberg. It 
was Indonesia's first contract with a foreign company 
after General Suharto seized power 
In December 1991, after the discovery of more 
copper and gold reserves at Mount Grasberg, the 
company signed a new Contract of Work massively 
increasing its exploration area. The new Contract of 
Work was for a period of 30 years with two possible 
10-year extensions. 
The Grasberg mine is operated by a local subsidiary 
known as PT Freeport Indonesia., which is owned 
90.64% by Freeport McMoran and 9.36% by the 
Indonesian government. 
Its concession covers an area of 230 square 
kilometres or 90 square miles. 
Between 1992 and 2003, the company paid over 
US$2.3 billion in taxes and royalties to Jakarta. In 
2005, the amount paid to the government rose to 
US$1.2 billion [Freeport McMoran Annual reports 
2003, p. 12 and 2005, p. 17]. 
Sales totalled 1 .46 billion pounds of copper and a 
record 2.8 million ounces of gold in 2005, compared 
with sales of 1.0 billion pounds of copper and 1.4 
million ounces of gold in 2004 [Freeport McMoran 
Annual report 2005 , p. 3] 
Until 2004, Rio Tinto owned a 13.1 shareholding in 
Freeport-McMoran. Its shares were sold in March of 
that year for US$ 882 million. 
Rio Tinto retained a 40 per cent joint venture 
interest in reserves mined as a consequence of 
expansions and developments at the Grasberg mine 
since 1998. 
In 2005, Rio Tinto's share of the 40 per cent joint 
venture amounted to 109,600 tonnes of copper and 
670,000 oz. of gold. 
Rio Tinto's earnings from the joint venture in 2005 
increased by US$ 200 million to US$ 232. 
See also TAPOL Occasional Reports No 16, 
'Freeport and the Tribal People' published in 1991. 
Thomas Okayo, Elkana Lokobal, Elias Tanaka, Matius 
Patrius Alangior and Obaya Papua. They are facing a 
number of charges, including murder and subversion. An 
unknown number of others wanted by the police are still 
in hiding. 
Lawyers were initially appointed by the state without 
regard to the wishes of the detainees but now 
arrangements have been made for a local NGO to assist. 
There is concern that those detained will be forced to sign 
a confession including a statement that they have not 
been tortured. There have been reports of torture against 
two of the detainees. 
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Asylum-seekers given Australian 
protection 
On 13 January this year, a group of forty-
three West Papuans set out from their 
homeland in a traditional dug-out canoe to 
make the hazardous journey to Australia to 
seek asylum. Two months later 42 
members of the group were granted 
permission to remai.n in Australia on 
temporary protection visas. Meanwhile, on 
the other side of the world, a Papuan was 
being feted for having won last year's John 
Humphrey Freedom Award. 
The asylum-seeking group included 36 adults and seven 
children . Their boat was adorned with a banner bearing 
the message: 'Save West Papua people soul from 
genocide and terrorist from military government of 
Indonesia. Also we West Papuan need Freedom Peace 
Justice in our Home Land' 
It is a wonder that their flimsy craft was able to survive 
the perilous waters . They departed from a point on the 
south coast of West Papua, near Merauke, and travelled 
about 250 kms across the Torres Strait. They arrived five 
days later at Weipa, halfway down the west side of Cape 
York peninsula. Several of those on board have been 
involved in pro-independence actions for a number of 
years. 
Leading the group was Herman Wanggai who has 
been in the forefront of the pro-independence struggle in 
West Papua for almost ten years. He was arrested in 
2002 for taking part in a flag-raising ceremony and spent 
two years in prison. His uncle, Thomas Wanggai, also 
actively involved in the Papuan struggle, died in an 
Indonesian prison in 1996. He too had been arrested for 
flag-raising. 
As soon as the asylum bid became public, the 
Indonesian government insisted that the Papuans had 
nothing to fear if they returned home. It warned the 
authorities in Canberra that the granting of asylum would 
have a damaging impact on relations between the two 
countries. But as one Australian commentator pointed out, 
the asylum bid was a huge embarrassment for the 
Indonesian government. 
After reaching Cape York, the most northerly point of 
Australia, on 18 January the refugees were taken to the 
remote Christmas Island, to be interviewed by immigration 
officials. A government spokesperson said that the 
Indonesian President 'had been told that they would be 
dealt with in accordance with Australia's domestic laws 
and its international obligations'. 
An immigration source was quoted as saying: 'Some of 
what has come out of the interviews has been absolutely 
heart-wrenching' [The Age, 29 January 2006] . The 
testimony included accounts of vicious beatings while 
being held in prison and attacks on villages and livestock 
in retaliation for people agitating for independence. 
On 23 March, it was announced that 42 members of 
the group had been granted temporary protection visas, 
which will allow them to remain in Australia for three 
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West Papuan asylum seekers on Christmas Island 
years. The application from the 43rd member of the group 
is still under consideration. 
The successful applicants were re-located to 
Melbourne to live in the local community. 
The case of the asylum seekers and the consequent 
diplomatic rift with Indonesia has become a major political 
issue in Australia. It has generated welcome media 
attention to the human rights situation in West Papua. 
Regrettably, however, the Indonesian government has 
seen fit to devote more time to remonstrating with 
Australia than it has to addressing the problems 
highlighted by the refugees. 
At the beginning of April, reports emerged of more 
Papuans attempting to flee to Australia with the 
unconfirmed arrival on an uninhabited island of a family 
of six. Meanwhile, both countries are taking steps to 
deter future refugees. The Indonesian navy is stepping up 
its surveillance of the area and in Jakarta, Papuans are 
finding it difficult, if not impossible, to obtain visas to visit 
Australia. President Yudhoyono visited Merauke on 4 
April in an apparent attempt to reassure local people that 
they have no reason to leave home. 
Young Papuan killed in Waghete 
While the asylum bid was underway, a young Papuan 
named Mozes Douw was shot dead by Kostrad troops on 
20 January in an incident near the town of Waghete in 
the Central Highlands. This incident shows how a minor 
problem involving Papuans can end tragically when 
soldiers in the locality intervene. 
Two days before Mozes Douw was killed, a group of 
Papuans had been asked to help shift a heavily-laden 
truck which had become bogged down in mud in a village 
1 O kms from Waghete. The men were advised to ask for 
a Collection Permission Letter so they could get paid for 
the work. After they had been given the document, two 
members of Kostrad standing nearby suddenly grabbed 
the letter, tore it up and threw it away. When the Papuans 
objected, a scuffle ensued and Petrus Pekey was shot and 
wounded. He was rushed to hospital in Enarotali for 
treatment. continued on page 6 
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Partition is unacceptable to 
Papuans 
Despite strong opposition from the 
majority of Papuans, the central 
government has gone ahead with the 
election of a governor in West lrian Jaya, a 
new province created without legal 
sanction. The views of the Papuan Peoples 
Assembly have been ignored, the unity of 
Papua has been threatened, and special 
autonomy has become virtually defunct. 
On 11 March this year, despite widespread opposition in 
Papua to the existence of West lrian Jaya, the government 
went ahead with the election of a governor of the new 
province. The creation of the province is in clear violation 
of the Special Autonomy law, introduced in 2001, 
according to which any move towards partition should 
have the agreement of the Maje/is Rakyat Papua (MRP), 
the Papuan People's Assembly. Moreover, as the result of 
manoeuvres by the government, the very existence of the 
MRP has been thrown into doubt. 
The creation of the new province came about through 
the reactivation of Law No 45 of 1999. This mandated 
the division of Papua into three provinces: lrian Jaya, 
Central lrian Jaya and West lrian Jaya. Whereas the 
creation of Central lrian Jaya was abandoned after fatal 
clashes broke out in Timika in August 2003, the 
establishment of West lrian Jaya was announced in 
November 2003. Asked for an opinion, Indonesia's 
Constitutional Court said that while partition was 
unlawful, it could not challenge the de facto existence of 
the new province. 
Although the province was still in legal limbo, the 
Minister of the Interior, former army general Muh. 
Ma'aruf, announced at very short notice that an election 
for governor would take place on 11 March, despite his 
earlier assurance to the MRP and the Papuan parliament, 
the DPRP, that this would not happen until its legal status 
had been reconciled with Special Autonomy. 
With Manokwari as its capital, a provincial parliament 
was elected in April 2004 while a caretaker governor 
started to develop its physical and political infrastructure. 
Clearly those with an interest in carving off part of West 
Papua were in a hurry and were making sure their efforts 
would not be thwarted. 
West lrian Jaya has a high number of migrants from 
Indonesia, bordering on half the population. It is 
estimated that within a year or two, Papuans will be in the 
minority. This explains why there was a relatively high 
turnout when the gubernatorial election took place on 11 
March. The province incorporates a significant share of 
Papua's natural resources, including the natural gas 
reserves now being exploited by BP at Bintuni Bay. 
Indonesian businessmen, including Vice-President Jusuf 
Kalla, are also eyeing the province for investments to cater 
for the ever expanding population there. 
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MRP's views ignored 
The establishment of the MRP was an integral part of the 
Special Autonomy law which specifies that the body must 
be consulted on issues of the governance of West Papua. 
The MRP has 42 members, all of whom are Papuans. The 
membership is divided equally between representatives of 
the churches, women and tribal groups. 
The central government set up the MRP with much 
delay and hesitation. And it soon became clear that many 
politicians in Jakarta feared that this body might fuel 
Papuan aspirations for independence. 
What most politicians failed to understand was that 
Papuan willingness to accept special autonomy was a 
compromise which some were prepared to make in the 
interests of reducing tensions in West Papua. Those 
accepting special autonomy were in effect shelving their 
long-held demand for independence. Far from 
acknowledging this move, by proceeding with the 
partition of West Papua, the central government risked 
alienating those whose support it had gained. 
The fraudulent Act of Free Choice 
Most Papuans have never lost sight of the fraudulent way 
in which their homeland was incorporated into the 
Indonesian Republic, by means of the so-called Act of 
Free Choice in 1969. Under strong pressure from the 
military, 1,022 handpicked persons voted unanimously in 
favour of integration. They had no other choice. This 
occurred when General Suharto was in power and the 
military exerted a dominant role in affairs of state. [See 
TAPOL Bulletin, No 181, December 2005 for a 
devastating exposure of the Act of Free Choice as a sham 
by the Dutch historian, Professor Pieter Drooglever.] 
Although Special Autonomy represented a major 
concession by the Papuans, politicians in Jakarta soon 
began to suspect that this governing structure would 
undermine Indonesia's territorial integrity and lead 
ultimately to Papua's secession. 
The attitude of the Indonesian President did not help 
matters. While campaigning for election as president in 
2004, Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono committed himself to 
implementing Special Autonomy. This accounts for the big 
support his candidacy enjoyed in West Papua. But he 
subsequently threw his political weight behind the 
existence of the West lrian Jaya province, declaring in a 
speech in August 2005 that its legal basis was Law No 32, 
2004, the Indonesian law on regional autonomy. 
Disenchantment with Special Autonomy 
It was not long before disenchantment with special 
autonomy set in among Papuans. Anger ran so deep that 
in February last year, the Dewan Adat Papua, the Papuan 
Tribal Council, announced that if implementation did not 
proceed satisfactorily within six months, they would 'hand 
back' the Special Autonomy Law. This is what happened 
in Jayapura on 12 August 2005 at a large demonstration 
in front of the provincial legislative assembly. 
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Secretary of the Council, Leonard lmbiri, said, before 
the demonstrat ion took place, that it was not aimed at 
pushing for independence, but was a protest at the failure 
of the government to improve the conditions of the 
Papuan people since the law was enacted . 
In Jakarta, Papuans demonst rated in front of the state 
palace and demanded that the government investigate 
alleged irregularities overseen by the then governor, 
J.P.Salossa. (Salossa died of a heart attack earlier this year.) 
According to Alof S.T. Rumayoni , director of the Bangun 
Nusa lrian Foundation , the provincial government has 
been allocated funds totalling Rp1 .7 trillion (US$174 
mill ion) for development in Papua since 2001 , but has 
buHt nothing. Another member of the Foundation, Abdul 
Warwey, said he had strong evidence of irregularities by 
the governor. 'The evidence includes bank accounts of 
some Papuan officials which, he said, 'were suspicious 
because the amounts of the money in these accounts was 
staggering.' [The Jakarta Post, 11 August, 2005] 
Criticism of how Special Autonomy had worked since 
its introduction in 2001 was the focus of speeches by 
Revd Sofyan Yo man, President of the Alliance of Baptist 
Churches in West Papua, during his visit to the UK in July 
last year. 
In May, shortly before his visit to the UK, he described 
the law on special autonomy as a cover for policies which 
perpetuate the sufferings of his people. He told his 
audiences that he was convinced that money allocated for 
special autonomy had been used to fund military 
operations. 
Powers of the MRP 
By virtue of the Special Autonomy Law and an 
accompanying Government Regrnlat,ion 54, the MRP has 
wide-ranging powers, including: checking that candidates 
for governor and deputy governor are eligible as 
indigenous Papuans; granting approval for provincial 
regulations implementing special autonomy provisions; 
granting approval for contracts between Jakarta or the 
provincial government and third parties for work affecting 
indigenous rights; and 'any planned pemekaran setting up 
new provinces in Papua'. 
Certainly the most impressive action undertaken by the 
MRP was to conduct a popular consultation in the area of 
continued from page 4 
Back at the scene of the incident, the Kostrad troops 
went on firing their weapons at passers-by. Among those 
who were hit was Mozes Douw who was on his way to 
school. He sustained severe injuries in his left shoulder and 
spine and died later in hospital. A third man, Yunike 
Kotouki, was also injured. 
The troops who were responsible for this tragedy have 
been identified in a chronology of the incident written by 
ELSHAM as being from KOSTRAD Timsus YONIF 753 
ARVITA (Arga Vira Tama) Nabire. 
Papuan lawyer receives international award 
In July last year, a Papuan human rights lawyer, Yan 
Christian Warinussy, was given the 2005 John Humphrey 
Freedom Award 'for his dedication to human rights in the 
face of extreme adversity, intimidation and threats to his 
personal safety'. 
Named after a Canadian law professor, who prepared 
the first draft of the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights, the award includes a US$25,000 grant as well as a 
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West lrian Jaya province. From 19 January to 3 February 
this year, the MRP held meetings with indigenous 
women 's groups , customary leaders, youth groups, 
religious leaders and district government throughout the 
province. While acknowledging that there was some . 
support among Papuans for the existence of the province, 
its three-volume report on the consultation demonstrates 
widespread opposition to the creation of the province. The 
overwhelming majority of the groups rejected pemekaran 
on the grounds that it was not carried out in accordance 
with the Special Autonomy Law. 
These convincing conclusions led to a counter-move by 
the West lrian Jaya government rejecting the consultations 
and accusing the MRP of over-stepping its mandate. 
Against a growing coalition between opponents of the 
consultation and the central government, the MRP has 
striven to contain the harmful effects of partition which 
has in effect become a fait accompli. In a letter to the 
central government on 14 February, the Chairman of the 
MRP, Agus Alue Alua presented a series of 
recommendations . These included holding a 
comprehensive dialogue with the MRP acting on behalf of 
the Papuan people, ensuring that any partition would 
safeguard Papua's cultural and economic unity, and 
establishing a mechanism to oversee and coordinate the 
governance of Papua as a single economic and cultural 
unit, all of which should be codified in a legal instrument. 
[See Papua: The Danger of Shutting Down Dialogue, 
published by the International Crisis Group on 23 March 
2006.] 
The clearly expressed wishes of the Papuan people 
have been ignored by Jakarta. This is a situation that is 
bound to intensify opposition among Papuans against 
Indonesia. 
An Australian academic renowned for his knowledge 
of Papuan affairs, Richard Chauvel, was quoted in March 
this year as saying: 'The core problem for Indonesia in 
Papua is governance. How do you rule a place by means 
other than military ones with a population that basically 
doesn't want to be part of Indonesia?' [The Age, 26 
March 2006] The recent events surrounding the creation 
of West lrian Jaya province can only deepen Papua's sense 
of alienation from Jakarta. 
tour of Canadian cities aimed at raising public awareness 
of the recipient's work on behalf of human rights. 
Speaking at a meeting in Victoria, Canada in 
November 2005, Wayne MacKay, a member of the John 
Humphrey Freedom Award international jury, said that Mr 
Warinussy has distinguished himself by his frontline role 
as a defence lawyer to those in West Papua's remote 
regions who would otherwise have no legal 
representation. In the past year, he has served as an 
independent human rights adviser on the resettlement of 
West Papuans affected by the British Petroleum natural 
gas facility in Bintuni Bay. 
He began working as a lawyer and human rights 
advocate in 1989 after finishing law school. In 1994 he 
co-founded The Institute for Research, Analysis and 
Development of Legal Aid (LP3PH), the first and, to this 
day, the only legal aid organisation in Manokwari. It works 
mainly with local communities to defend them against 
military persecution and human rights violations. 
Source:Tok Blong Pasifik, Volume 4, Issue 1, Winter 
2006. 
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Timika ambush suspeds await 
trial 
Eight people are awaiting trial in Jakarta 
on charges of involvement in an ambush 
which led to the deaths of two US teachers 
a,nd one Indonesian teacher in August 
2002. The men were arrested in Timika as 
the result of an entrapment involving the 
FBI. 
The city of Timika is close to the copper-and-gold mine 
run by Freeport-McMoran and it is where many of the 
foreign and domestic personnel employed by the mine are 
accommodated . The three men who were killed during 
the ambush on 31 August 2002 were all teachers: two 
Americans, Rickey Lynn Spier, aged 44, of Littleton, 
Colorado, and 71-year-old Leon Edwin Burgon, of Sun 
River, Oregon, and an Indonesian, Bambang Riswanto. 
The three men were employed at an international 
school for children of those working at the mine. Twelve 
other people were injured, including children. Rickey 
Spier's wife, Patsy, was among the injured and has since 
tirelessly campaigned for justice for the victims It is thanks 
to her persistent efforts that international attention had 
been so heavily focused on the case. 
Shortly after the ambush, the Indonesian police as well 
as the human rights organisation, ELSHAM, conducted 
investigations which concluded that the military had been 
involved in the kill ings. There were susp.icions at the time 
that the Indonesian military was warning Freeport that 
their security operations in Timika might not continue 
without a hike in payment for protection. However, the 
police were subsequently forced to retract their findings, 
while ELSHAM faced threats and even a lawsuit if they 
insisted on pursuing the matter. 
As Indonesia's leading English-language newspaper, 
The Jakarta Post, recently wrote: 'There has never been a 
satisfactory answer to certain questions raised by human 
rights organisations in Papua. Why were security 
personnel in a normally tightly guarded area near the 
world's biggest copper and gold mine absent during the 
attack, which lasted at least 30 minutes? Why did some of 
the survivors remember the shooters wearing military 
uniforms?' [The Jakarta Post, 18 January 2006] 
Given the impunity which members of the Indonesian 
armed forces have enjoyed for so many years, such 
questions are entirely reasonable. 
US authorities get involved 
Following the controversy surrounding the ambush, the 
case lay dormant for some time. Indonesia's failure to 
produce results was one of the factors that delayed the 
restoration of military relations between Washington and 
Jakarta that were severed in 1999 following the 
Indonesian army's murderous rampage in East Timor. 
In 2004, a Papuan named Antonius Wamang, was 
indicted by a US grand jury on two counts of murder and 
eight counts of attempted murder in connection with the 
ambush. At the time, Wamang was still at large and there 
was no sign that he would be apprehended. 
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As pressure grew in the US for the restoration of 
military ties with Indonesia, the FBI became involved in 
securing the detention of possible suspects. On 11 
January this year, during what can only be described as an 
entrapment, twelve persons were arrested . 
The detentions occurred when twelve men were 
enticed into visiting Hotel Amole 2 in Timika. FBI agents 
were present at the time but have since claimed that they 
were not involved in the arrests. No one doubts that they 
played a critical role in securing the detentions. 
Indeed, the national police spokesman Brigadier 
General Anton Bachrul Alam, admitted that FBI agents 
had assisted in securing the arrests by providing 
information on the whereabouts of the men. FBI 
involvement had been crucial, he said, because of their 
more sophisticated technology in criminal investigations, 
but he said that they would not take part in interrogating 
the men. 
A case of entrapment 
The arrests were condemned by Paula Makabori of the 
Papuan NGO, ELSHAM. She said the FBI agent in Timika 
had told the men that they would be taken to the US but 
after they had gathered at the hotel, they were taken to a 
vehicle which drove them to the local police headquarters. 
From there, they were flown to Jayapura and then to 
Jakarta. 
The twelve arrested men were: Antonius Wamang, 
Revd Ishak Onawame, Hardi Sugomol, Agustinus 
Anggaibak, Viktus Wamang, Markus Kalabetme, Yohanes 
Kasamol, Germanus Magal, Diminikus Mom, Zairus 
Kiwak, Esau Onowame and Velli Dekme. Four were later 
released and the other eight are under interrogation in 
preparation for trial, either as suspects or witnesses. 
Hailing the arrests, the commander of the Trikora 
military command in Jayapura was quick to insist that they 
proved 'the TNI was not involved in the shootings'. 
Defence lawyer takes issue with FBI 
The Indonesian human rights organisation, PBHI, is acting 
for the men now detained in Jakarta. One of the PBHI 
lawyers, Johnson Panjaitan complained that two FBI 
agents had secretly interrogated one of his clients. They 
went to the detention room shortly after he had left, and 
interrogated Agustinus Anggaibak. According to Johnson, 
Agustinus was interrogated by the agent for four hours. 'I 
wonder how they got involved. They weren't respecting 
our legal procedures,' he said. [The Jakarta Post, 20 
January 2006] 
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Peace process still on track 
Since the signing of the Peace Treaty 
on 15 August 2005, events have 
moved fast in Aceh. Both sides have 
diligently complied with the 
agreeme1nt as a result of which acts 
of violence have declined to a few 
isolated incidents. But a number of 
crucial issues are still on the agenda. 
They include the creation of a new 
and democratic Aceh, the 
reintegration of former GAM 
combatants and intensifying the 
post-tsunami reconstruction of the 
territory. 
The Memorandum of Understanding (MoU), 
signed in Helsinki has created a new framework 
for the governance of Aceh . Although it was 
agreed that the law on governance in Aceh was to 
have entered into force by 31 March 2006, a 
delay of a few months was not unexpected . In 
April , the draft law was still under discussion in 
the DPR, Indonesia's national parliament. 
Indonesian Human Rights Minister Hamid Awaluddin(left) and 
GAM representative Malik Mahmud(right) at peace treaty 
signing with former Finnish President Martti Ahtisaari 
After adoption of the draft law, local elections 
wil ll be held but they will also be later than intended 
because of the ongoing discussions in parliament. It now 
appears likely that elections for governor and district 
chiefs will take place in August. 
The long-winded RUUPA process 
The MoU established the principles for the law on 
governance. The vast majority of people in Aceh have 
participated in drafting the law, known as RUUPA 
(Rancangan Undang-Undang Pemerintahan Aceh) . 
As early as September 2005, just one month after the 
signing of the MoU, Acehnese were showing their 
preparedness to build and rebuild a new and democratic 
post-conflict society. A consultative process was set up 
with the help of three universities. Public hearings were 
he:ld throughout the territory. They also involved 
Acehnese communities in places like Jakarta and Medan. 
The drafting process for the RUUPA was a shining 
example of participatory democracy. Members of the 
public from all levels of society were eager to be involved 
in discussing the new political landscape in Aceh . 
Meanwhile in Jakarta, the Ministry of the Interior held 
public hearings. After considering several draft bills, a final 
proposal was sent to Jakarta for submission to parliament. 
The draft contained a number of inconsistencies, reflecting 
the plurality of political views among the Acehnese. 
While plural democracy in Aceh proceeded well, the 
subsequent process in Jakarta was far from smooth. 
Interior Minister Muhammad Ma'aruf, a retired army 
general, convened a working group involving several 
ministries to review all the articles in the RUUPA and to 
examine whether any of the articles would contradict 
national laws. In mid January Minister Ma'aruf sent his 
final, watered down version to the state secretary, who is 
charged with approving the final version. 
On 27 January 2006, after being reviewed by the 
President, the RUUPA was submitted to parliament. Final 
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adoption is likely to take several months, the delay being 
exacerbated by the parliamentary recess. 
Protests in Aceh 
Acehnese civil society has shown a determination to take 
an active part in the RUUPA process, from beginning to 
end, right up to its final acceptance. At one point, the 
decision to scrap several crucial articles led to intense 
lobbying by Acehnese at all levels, including Acehnese 
members of the DPR in Jakarta. In the end, they were 
disappointed because the final version was much weaker 
than the original version submitted from Aceh . 
The guiding principles of the law on Aceh governance 
laid down in the MoU are crystal clear and grant Aceh a 
special place in the Indonesian archipelago. The MoU 
avoids using the term autonomy, because the special 
autonomy previously introduced in Aceh was nothing 
more than an empty shell. Instead, the term self-
government was used, but this was scrapped by the 
Interior Ministry much to the chagrin of the many 
Acehnese involved 1in the initial drafting process. Since 
GAM had declared its decision to end the armed struggle 
and shelve its demand for independence, the appropriate 
response should at the very least have led to far-reaching 
arrangements enabling the Acehnese to run their own 
affairs. 
In early April, many thousands of Acehnese from all 
the major cities took to the streets to demand that the 
RUUPA conform fully with the guidelines of the MoU. A 
month earlier, several public meetings attended by 
hundreds of people had given a clear warning to Jakarta 
that the aspirations of the Acehnese as expressed in the 
original draft, should be honoured by parliament. If the 
final draft bill fails to accommodate the wishes of the 
people, the demand for independence could re-emerge, 
triggering another rebellion. During the meetings it was 
recalled that a previous peace treaty between Jakarta and 
Acehnese rebels concluded in the fifties was betrayed, 
TAPOL Bulletin 182/April 2006 
resulting in the province being exploited 
while nothing was done to alleviate the 
poverty of the population. 
COHA and the Mou 
Several years ago, an earlier peace 
process led to an agreement called 
COHA (Cessation of Hostilities 
Agreement). This document was 
concluded in December 2002 in Geneva 
with an agreement to end military 
actions, to establish peace zones and 
bring about an all-inclusive dialogue 
involving the Acehnese. This meant that 
Acehnese civil society, as stakeholder, 
was involved in the peace talks. But the 
Helsinki talks didn't go that far, limiting 
the talks to the two warring parties while 
making provision for civil society to play 
an important role. The 2006 MoU 
included a special section under the 
heading 'political participation' with 
A.CEH 
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eight articles guaranteeing the 
involvement of the Acehnese in the 
arrangements of a future Aceh 
government. Students demonstrating outside the grand mosque in Banda Aceh 
Another striking difference between 
COHA and the MoU was the degree of political will . 
During the COHA period, GAM retained its option of 
independence while the TNI, the Indonesian armed 
forces, continued to see GAM as an enemy needing to be 
eliminated. The conditions in January 2005 were quite 
different. GAM agreed to drop its demand for 
independence and the political leadership in Jakarta 
agreed to accommodate most of GAM's wishes. Parts of 
Aceh had been heavily struck by the tsunami and the 
issue had been internationalised, all of which accelerated 
the peace process. However, in May 2003 the COHA 
peace process was terminated by Jakarta under the 
presidency of Megawati and a vicious war raged until the 
tsunami disaster struck. 
While COHA tried to make arrangements for a post-
conflict Aceh during the process of negotiations, the 
Helsinki talks regarded the process of rebuilding Aceh as a 
political process which should take place in the wake of 
the peace treaty. It is now up to the Acehnese, supported 
by AMM, the Aceh Monitoring Mission (established by 
the EU and ASEAN), and the BRR, the body responsible 
for the rehabilitation and reconstruction of Aceh and the 
island of Nias to implement this comprehensive process. 
Instead of being a place of desperation, deprived of 
any space for democracy, Aceh has suddenly become 
arguably the only place in the Indonesian republic where 
political participation can blossom, where local political 
parties and aspirations have become possible and where 
decentralisation has real meaning. 
However, it will not be an easy process. As a result of 
30 years of conflict, the Acehnese have not developed any 
experience of democratic processes. Democratic 
experiments need to start from scratch; and at present the 
signs are hopeful. One local political party has already 
been established and others are expected to follow. It is 
also likely that when the local elections are held, an 
attractive range of candidates will contest the positions of 
governor, mayors and district chiefs. People in other parts 
of Indonesia are watching Aceh with bewilderment and 
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astonishment because so much has changed in this former 
place of conflict. 
Basically a successful peace process 
These days, peace processes around the world more often 
than not take many twists and turns. However, the peace 
process in Aceh has so far held remarkably well. The 
striking display of political will from both sides - the 
Jakarta government and the GAM leadership - provided a 
healthy basis for the rapid advance from war to peace in 
Aceh. 
The complex phase of demilitarisation involving the 
withdrawal of troops and the return of combatants to 
their villages took only a few months and was completed 
by the end of 2005. In many other conflicts around the 
world, such a process, constituting as it does the most 
complicated part of a peace process, has usually taken 
years. War weariness and the destruction caused by the 
tsunami accelerated the process from the side of GAM 
while the new political leadership in Jakarta became 
increasingly aware that a military solution for Aceh was 
bound to fail. After two years of military operations, 
which created suffering and hardship for the population, 
the newly elected president, Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono 
and his vice-president, Yusuf Kalla decided go ahead with 
a political solution, resulting in the Helsinki talks of 
January 2005. 
Issues still to be resolved 
Whilst there is cause for optimism that so much has been 
achieved in such a short time, it is also true that some 
aspects have proceeded slowly. The success of post-
tsunami reconstruction depends very much on the success 
of the peace process. But many handicaps remain. 
Although the amount of money raised around the world 
exceeded all expectations, reconstruction has proceeded 
far too slowly. BBR, the body responsible for rebuilding 
and reconstruction, recently announced that a mere 9.4 
per cent of the targeted houses (1,500 out of 16,000 
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houses) had been rebuilt on Nias. Rebuilding in .Aceh is 
also far below target. One of the major handicaps is the 
scarcity of building material, bricks and timber. As a result, 
fifteen months after the tsunami, many survivors are still 
living in barracks or tents, feeling frustrated by the delays. 
The fate of political prisoners 
One major success of the peace process was the general 
amnesty granted to the majority of GAM prisoners. 
Almost 2,000 prisoners being held in various prisons all 
over Aceh were immediately released and allowed to go 
home. A follow-up arrangement to reintegrate the former 
prisoners has started and in some villages they have 
already embarked on a new life. 
But for 62 prisoners being held outside Aceh, mostly in 
the notorious prison of Tanjung Gusta in North Sumatra, 
the amnesty arrangement has yet to be applied. Several 
ex-GAM combatants have approached AMM, the body 
mandated to monitor implementation of the MoU, to 
press for the early release of these 62 prisoners. One of 
the problems complicating their release is that they were 
tried and convicted for alleged criminal acts and not 
because of their political beliefs . 
Reintegration of GAM 
The MoU agreement included an arrangement for the 
demobilisation of 3,000 GAM combatants . The Indonesian 
government made arrangements to reintegrate this 
number of ex-combatants and provide them with 
monthly allowances and other facilities such as land or the 
offer of job opportunities. 
During the first phases of decommissioning, when the 
guerrillas came down from their hiding places and handed 
in their weapons, it became clear that there were far more 
that 3,000 ex-combatants because the guerrilla force was 
much larger than thought, so a new round of negotiations 
was needed to handle this problem. Experiences in other 
places of conflict have taught that reintegration is a long 
and winding process, often bedevilled by failure than 
success. 
A big part of the problem was the nature of TNA, the 
armed wing of GAM. It was a very decentralised force 
and its commander-in-chief, Muzakkir Manaf, was only in 
command of the regional TNA commanders without 
having any direct control over the decentralised units. 
Many TNA guerrillas were part-time combatants who 
often returned home to their villages to start working 
again as peasants. Wise leadership from local GAM 
leaders will be needed to resolve this delicate issue. 
KTP Merah Putih scrapped 
Another difficult legacy that needs to be resolved is the 
special ID (KTP) card which is only valid for Acehnese, 
introduced after Aceh was placed under martial law in 
May 2003 . While other Indonesian citizens carry ordinary 
IDs, the Acehnese were issued with special red-and-white 
IDs. In several districts, the local authorities are now 
issuing normal ID cards with queues formed by those 
eager to get their hands on them. Having to carry special 
IDs is seen as a form of discrimination. 
Human rights issues 
Kontras Aceh, being one of the main human rights 
organisations in Aceh, was suddenly inundated with many 
new problems. Although day-to-day human rights 
violations have declined sharply, the organisation is now 
10 
-- -- - ----~ --- ------·~-----· ------- -------------
busily dealing with many 'old' problems. There have been 
many complaints from the victims of past violations. While 
arrangements have been made for GAM members to 
receive compensation and other facilities, others who were 
not combatants but who were victimised, mostly by 
members of the security forces, have not been given 
similar treatment and are demanding justice. 
There are also legal aspects needing to be 
implemented. The MoU includes three articles on human 
rights, one of which provides for the establishment of a 
human rights court in Aceh and another provides for a 
truth and reconciliation commission. At the moment, it is 
not known whether these will be provided for within the 
framework of the RUUPA or on the basis of another law. 
- --- --- ---·----·-·---·------- ---
Sharia lavv takes its 
toll on vvomen's 
rights 
Aceh has borne the full force of the recent 
imposition of sharia law which has been 
introduced recently in several parts of 
Indonesia. 
According to a recent visitor to Aceh, sharia is a serious 
underlying current. No one is systematically monitoring it 
and no one wants to speak out against it for fear of 
provoking condemnation from religious circles. There is 
now a sharia department (dinas sharia) and sharia police 
and court which have been installed under the governor's 
office. Implementation has been directed primarily against 
women . They are now being picked up and jailed for 
appearing in public without their heads covered with a 
ji/bab, and prisons are now full of women who are 
accused of violating the law. Local sources say that the 
women were arrested by the sharia police, working in 
parallel with the regular police, though they do not have 
powers of arrest. 
As it is being currently .interpreted in Aceh, sharia law 
requires women to keep their whole body covered with 
the exception of their palms and face while for men, it 
means covering the lower body from the belly to the 
knees. 
A low-cut top or signs of the navel are now being 
treated as a crime. Couples holding hands or seen in close 
embrace are also breaking the law. This is happening at a 
time when Acehnese are taking advantage of the more 
peaceful atmosphere since the agreement between the 
government and GAM, with jazz concerts, parties and 
lively discussions taking place everywhere. 
An observer who was in Aceh in mid April described 
how she saw a happy crowd of boys playing soccer, which 
came to an abrupt end when the morality police 
appeared . When on a visit to an orphanage, she was 
shocked when only boys appeared at dinner time, while 
the girls stayed in their rooms. 'We will have our dinner 
after the boys,' one of the girls told her later. 'We are not 
supposed to be together in one room with the boys.' 
continued on page 24 
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Civil supremacy and reform of 
the military 
One of the most important features of the 
post-Suharto era is the long and difficult 
process of reforming the military (TNI). 
Ever since the birth of the Indonesian 
Republic, the military have played a 
dominant role i,n pofitical life. TNI 
spokesman Major-General Kohirin Suganda 
recently acknowledged that returning the 
military to its proper function will take 
time. But reform of other institutions, 
particularly the judiciary and the 
legis!lature, is also essential. The process 
has begun but there is still a long way to 
go. 
The appointment of Air Force chief, Marshall Djoko 
Suyanto as TNI commander-in-chief in January was a big 
step forward. This important political decision by President 
Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (SBY) paved the way for 
other developments. Never before has an air force officer 
held this position and the appointment was controversial 
as at least three key army generals had been named as 
candidates. 
Even more important, the former army chief-of-staff 
General Ryamizard Ryacudu, a notorious hardliner, had 
already been assigned to the position by the President's 
predecessor Megawati Sukarnoputri, but as soon as he 
took over as head of state, SBY shelved the designated 
appointment. SBY's agenda was to safeguard the Aceh 
peace process while Ryacudu was in charge of military 
operations there. The demilitarisation of Aceh was crucial 
and that meant withdrawing troops and ending the 
hostilities. SBY could not have had a hardliner in such a 
key position. 
Demise of the political role of TNI? 
It could be argued that the demise of Ryacudu also 
indicates an important thrust within the military top brass 
in another direction. For decades, top military men have 
been political decision-makers, not least among them 
General Suharto himself. The downfall of Suharto in 1998 
meant the end of the Dwifungsi doctrine, which justified 
the military's role in politics. Despite that, top-ranking 
generals like General Wiranto and Ryacudu continued to 
play a major role in politics. 
The emergence of pro-reform generals and the battle 
they fought with the status quo at army headquarters in 
the name of reformasi was again a typical political battle. 
But the person who emerged as number one was a rather 
colourless officer, General Endriartono Sutarto. His 
appointment was an excellent choice as he turned out to 
be a cautious reformer. 
In 2004 the military lost their seats in parliament, 
another step forward in driving the military out of politics. 
All signs show that General Endriartono and his successor 
Marshall Djoko Suyanto represent a new generation in the 
TNI who accept civil supremacy and are willing to proceed 
along the path of improving professionalism within the 
TNI. 
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Political generals like Wiranto, Try Sutrisno and others 
are now retired and their role in society is relatively 
limited. The present batch of milita·ry commanders, 
notably the commanders in major cities like Jakarta, 
Bandung, Yogyakarta and Surabaya, rarely appear in the 
press and hardly play a role in the daily life of the 
community. The dominant security role is now in the 
hands of police chiefs, who have to deal with such 
burning issues as crime, terrorism, corruption and other 
serious problems in any big city. In the Suharto days, the 
military commander of Jakarta was bound to get a top-
level post and was almost daily in the headlines. The 
present commander, Major-General Agustadi, keeps a low 
profile and many people in Jakarta don't even know his 
name. This would have been unthinkable a few years ago. 
The gradual disappearance of younger officers with 
political ambitions is a hopeful sign that Indonesia is 
heading in the right direction. But military reform is far 
from over and structural reforms still have a long way to 
go. 
SBY and the class of '73 
The President displayed his political skills by manoeuvring 
some of his most trusted people at the top of the 
hierarchy. A few months before the appointment of Djoko 
Suyanto, Police General Sutanto was appointed National 
Police Chief. SBY, Suyanto and Sutanto were classmates 
during their academy years and they all graduated in 
1973. By appoint,ing two trusted classmates, SBY has at 
least secured loyalty and stability at the top of the police 
force and in the TNI for the next two or three years. 
Looking back at the President's own military career, 
there were early signs that he was not merely pursuing a 
military career but looking also for different possibilities. 
While climbing the military ladder, he obtained his masters 
degree in 1991 and a PhD in agricultural economics in 
2004. By then, he had already occupied several cabinet 
posts during the presidencies of Gus Dur and Megawati. 
In 1996, when the crisis in East Timar turned into a 
heated international issue, SBY adopted a different 
position by accepting a political settlement for East Timar, 
challenging the official line and the views of his superior, 
General Wiranto who was commander-in-chief at the 
time. 
Between 1997 and 2001 SBY was known as a 
reformist TNI officer, together with other officers like Agus 
Wirahadikusumah, Romulo Simbolon, Saurip Kadi and 
Agus Widjoyo. For a brief period this small group of 
officers were catapulted by Gus Dur into senior positions 
but the ploy failed because the majority of TNI officers 
were solidly against this reformist group. Agus 
Wirahadikusumah died mysteriously and the others were 
basically sidestepped. By then, SBY had already secured a 
high position in the civilian hierarchy and had transformed 
himself into a national political and civilian leader. 
Politik Panglima and Panglima Politik 
Roughly translated these terms mean 'politics of the 
military commander' and 'the commander of politics' . This 
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Left to right: President SBY, Navy Chief Slamet Soebijanto, former TNI commander Endriartono Sutarto, 
TNI commander Djoko Santoso, Army Chief Djoko Suyanto 
slogan emerged during the Suharto years. He ruled the 
country as military commander and at the same time 
commanded politics. In a certain way SBY has the same 
credentials but political conditions have changed since the 
demise of Suharto. Suharto created a totalitarian state 
where there was no division between the executive, 
judiciary and legislature. 
SBY became head of state through direct elections and 
won convincingly. But he inherited a different Indonesia 
where, on paper, independent institutions do exist. In this 
transitional period, it will take quite some time before the 
independence of the judiciary and the legislature becomes 
a fact of life. In the meantime both institutions frequently 
reflect the old politics of the Suharto days and portray 
decay, corruption and collusion. 
SBY is known as a cautious man and he will proceed 
very slowly. Many retired generals still function in key 
positions all over the place, as civil servants, as members 
of local parliaments, as provincial governors and so on. 
Some hold key positions like retired Lt General Sudi 
Silalahi who functions as SBY's cabinet secretary or retired 
Lt General Syafrie Syamsuddin who is secretary-general at 
the Defence Department. Whether intentionally or not, 
these people are keeping the Dwifungsi alive. 
A new group of conservative nationalists is emerging 
as an unofficial opposition outside parliament. The group 
includes civilians like Akbar Tandjung, formerly chair of 
GOLKAR, and former president, Megawati, as well as 
former army heavyweights like retired General Try 
Sutrisno and retired General Wiranto. They are using 
every opportunity to criticise the government with 
nationalistic arguments such as allowing foreign 
corporations to squander the country's wealth . 
Reform under Habibie and Gus Dur 
The fall of the dictatorship in May 1998 became the 
signal for reformers to demand a complete overhaul of the 
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TNI and an end to impunity. It is worthwhile to scrutinise 
what has happened with TNI reform since May 1998. 
Since the fall of Suharto many parameters have 
changed in Indonesia, not least the fact that in the last 
eight years there have been four presidents, several 
terrorist attacks have hit important urban areas, there 
have been two general elections, a law on autonomy has 
been adopted and implemented and the TNI has lost 
much of its political power. 
Habibie and Abdurrahman Wahid (Gus Dur), the two 
first presidents after reformasi, tried very hard to reform 
the military but without much success. Megawati didn't 
even try and her presidency can be seen as wasted years 
as far as military reform is concerned. 
The Habibie administration tried to end impunity by 
taking some hardline generals to court. But as nothing had 
yet been done to reform the judiciary, all the officers were 
acquitted. Habibie's presidency lasted for only one year, 
which was far too short, and the structure of the TNI was 
left untouched. 
Gus Dur tried to reform the military but in hindsight all 
analysts conclude that he lacked the necessary 
statesmanship skills to impilement this . Less than two years 
later, he was removed from office through a humiliating 
impeachment. Gus Dur was ousted by two forces : the 
army who carried out a parade in front of the palace in an 
act of defiance and the next day, the MPR, the People's 
Congress, full of members who were retired generals or 
politicians from the Suharto era. 
Despite their many flaws, Habibie and Gus Dur 
achieved a few important things. POLRI, the Police Force, 
was removed from the TNI, making it clear that law and 
order was a police task and that the TNI should be 
transformed into a proper professional defence force. 
Gus Dur tried to get rid of the hardliners and actually 
removed the powerhouse General Wiranto, arguably the 
most influential officer from 1997 to 2001 . He also tried 
to dispense with General Ryamizard Ryacudu, the new 
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army chief-of-staff, but failed and paid the price. It 
became clear to political analysts that reform within TNI 
was sluggish and consisted of much more than simply 
replacing officers. 
While the top brass of the TNI is now moving towards 
a more professional attitude, by becoming a defence 
force, it lacks all the basics to achieve this. 
Toothless and ruthless 
It is often argued that brutality by TNI soldiers in places 
like East Timar in the past, West Papua now and Aceh 
until very recently is the result of a lack of professionalism 
and the basics of military training. This is not a problem 
unique to Indonesia; in many other countries, the military 
in combat behaves ruthlessly towards the local population . 
In the past fifty years, wars have increasingly victimised 
the civilian population. One explanation is that the 
military is not capable of pacifying a region and starts 
behaving in a brutal way as a result of a lack of 
confidence, to such an extent that resistance from the 
local population is bound to intensify. 
If one assesses the TNl's performance on the 
battlefield, in particular in East Timar and Aceh, it can be 
concluded that it has performed woefully and was never 
capable of containing any security threats. The reason is 
lack of proper training and suitable equipment and the 
lack of an appropriate mindset. 
The basics of the TNI are indeed fundamentally 
flawed. Juwono Sudarsono, the defence minister, has 
admitted that the 380,000 TNI troops have 'no deterrent 
capability'. Only 65 of the navy's 121 ships and half of 
the air force's 114 aircraft are operational, while most of 
the army's 100-odd battalions are below-strength, under-
equipped and under-trained. (Financial Times, 18 February 
2006) 
In the first weeks of the tsunami disaster, the poor 
quality of TNI units again became apparent when 
professional military units from neighbouring countries 
such as Singapore and Malaysia came to help the victims. 
Well equipped, using the most advanced helicopters and 
heavy material, teamed by skilled medical stuff, the 
neighbouring armies were very useful while TNI assistance 
was limited to basic tasks such as handing out food, 
removing corpses and so on. 
Armed forces budget 
Arguably one of the major stumbling blocks in the way of 
structural reform of the TNI is the notorious 30-70 figure: 
the armed forces gets only 30 per cent of the money it 
needs from the state while it must find the remaining 70 
per cent itself. Since Juwono Sudarsono became defence 
minister, the TNI budget has increased by 7.5 per cent as 
compared with 2005 but the 30-70 figure still holds. 
For the 2006 budget, Rp 23.6 trillion (US$ 2.6 billion) 
has been allocated but the actual needs have gone up fo 
Rp 56.9 trillion (US 6.2 billion). 
In every sense, the TNI is mini-sized. For a large 
country with the world's fourth largest population, 
Indonesia only has 279.000 troops, divided between the 
army (around 220,000), the air force (24,000) and the 
navy (35,000). It is relatively speaking, much smaller than 
the armed forces in neighbouring countries. Wages are 
also very low; a low-ranking soldier earns Rp700,000 
(US$77) a month which needs to be topped up with food 
and operational bonuses in order to survive. It is far from 
easy for Defence Minister Juwono Sudarsono to fill the 
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huge gap in the budget and much time and energy has 
therefore been devoted to reorganising and revitalising 
military businesses. 
Military businesses 
Having its own source of income has been a tradition 
within the TNI since it was formed in 1945. As military 
commander of Central Java in the fifties, Suharto was 
notorious for his involvement in all kinds of illegal business 
schemes including barter (smuggling of goods) to and 
from Singapore. Each division or regional command 
owned companies, cooperatives and foundations. They 
were all supposed to improve the welfare of the soldiers 
but more often than not, the top layer of officers became 
rich while ordinary soldiers lived in woeful conditions in 
shabbily-built barracks. 
Over the years, in particular after 1965, military 
businesses mushroomed. Some of the most juicy state 
companies, like the state oil company Pertamina, fell into 
the hands of the military and billion of dollars were 
siphoned off. The nouveaux riche of Jakarta in the 
seventies were mostly army officers functioning as CEOs 
in state companies. Mismanagement and rampant 
corruption soon became the norm of these companies. 
Military business reached its peak in the eighties when 
the economy of Indonesia (and Southeast Asia) was 
booming. Special relations were built with businessmen 
who were often Chinese, in mutually beneficial, highly 
lucrative deals. But the fairy tale didn't last long. The 
monetary crisis in 1997 hit the Indonesian economy very 
hard, resulting in the bankruptcy of many military 
businesses. 
Already in the early eighties, the TNI tried to re-
organise the many companies it owned. A Chinese 
businessman, Sofyan Wanandi was asked to carry out a 
big overhaul. Companies which were badly run and had 
huge losses were closed while the profit-making ones 
were revitalised and in many cases merged . A trust 
company was set up, PT Truba, to put all the companies 
under one roof. For a while things went well, but the 
monetary crisis in 1997 delivered an almost fatal blow to 
military businesses. Former chief of staff General Ryacudu, 
recently frankly admitted that military businesses could 
only mark up an annual profit of Rp30 billion (US$ 3.3 
million). 
Defence Minister Juwono Sudarsono has now decided 
to bring all the military businesses under his department 
which will be regulated by law. Of the 219 companies 
that are listed as military companies, only about ten are 
reasonably profitable. The TNI top brass has agreed in 
principle that the Defence Department will supervise the 
companies but still expect to continue receiving a hefty 
sum. There is still major disagreement about the future of 
several foundations (actually profit-making corporations). 
Most of these foundations emerged in the Suharto period 
and became mega-size corporations. 
TNI supremo, Marshall Djoko Suyanto, argues that 
some of the key foundations are being run for the benefit 
and welfare of the soldiers. If these are taken away, the 
TNI will lose the extra income that is so desperately 
needed. 
In reality, things are much more complex. Investments 
and shareholders are very much intertwined. The military 
foundations often have considerable assets and shares in a 
variety of private businesses. Recently Yayasan Kartika Eka 
Pakci, one the major military foundations, sold its shares 
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(11 per cent) in Bank Artha Graha and reaped Rp121 
billion (US$ 13,5 million). Assets may have been invested 
in land, real estate, banking or other enterprises. It will 
take years before all the military assets can be properly 
accounted for. 
Another difficulty is the wealth of certain officers. 
While the salary of Indonesian generals is around US$300 
a month, their life style shows that some of them are 
millionaires, much of their wealth being in foreign 
currency. Corruption, additional incomes and so on have 
been rampant in the last three decades. It will be a hard 
for the several anti-corruption institutions to track this 
down, but some cases are obvious. The Bank Artha Graha 
mentioned above, which is run by a notorious Chinese 
tycoon Tommy Winata, is often referred to as the bank of 
the generals. It is a public secret that high-ranking officers 
put their money in this bank in return for which Bank 
Artha Graha enjoys extra protection . 
The bottom line is that since the birth of the TNI, 
military business practices have been accepted as normal 
and have even been legalised. A great deal of effort and 
time will be needed to control this, assuming that the end 
result is achievable. 
Illegal business activiities 
Next to murky military businesses there is a much larger 
sector of illegal and extra-curricular activity of the military. 
Official figures say that the state loses some US$ 22 billion 
a year through smuggling, illegal logging, piracy and other 
crimes. Most of these lucrative businesses are based in the 
outer islands. Analysts claim that mi ~litary involvement has 
increased enormously, in particular in the wake of the 
1997 monetary crisis. While the political and economic 
activities of the TNI have decreased significantly in 
Jakarta, their activities in the regions have steadily 
increased. The regional autonomy law provides more 
money and po'litical power in the districts, which means 
that the territorial structure of the army can be very 
beneficial for legal and illegal business activities. 
Illegal logging is an extremely serious threat to the 
environment and it is a publ.ic secret that timber barons 
from Malaysia together with local tycoons have been 
involved in cutting down forests in remote places in 
Kalimantan and other islands. All this cannot occur 
without the knowledge and collusion of the local 
authorities, including the military. Other illegal activities 
show the same pattern: piracy and smuggling are rampant 
because of the involvement of the military and police 
authorities. 
Another lucrative activity falls under the broad 
category of moonlighting. This can be something quite 
innocent like taking a job as the driver or bodyguard of a 
rich businessman or something far less savoury like 
making threats or beating up business competitors. Lower 
down the scale, moonlighters are used as hit men to 
eliminate rivals. 
Protecting big companies like the copper and gold 
mine Freeport is being coordinated by the military 
command in West Papua. The US-based company pays 
millions of dollars annually to the military commander as 
well as to ordinary soldiers [see separate article]. 
Sinter and Binyah 
Ever since the reform of the armed forces started, one of 
the main demands of civil society has been to abolish the 
territorial structure of the army. The army structure 
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reaches right down to village level as a shadow structure 
of the civil administration. In the first two decades of 
Suharto's New Order, the army territorial structure was 
the dominant structure. That explains why the TNI has so 
far refused to abandon the territorial structure as it has 
become a lucrative money-making machine. 
At the top of the TNI structure, the special commander 
for territorial affairs (Aster, Asisten Territorial, Assistant for 
Territorial Affairs) has been abolished, but the territorial 
structure at the bottom is alive and kicking. 
Nowadays the structure is better known by such 
abbreviations as binyah (bina wilayah, regional guidance) 
and binter (bina territorial, territorial guidance). The term 
bina or guidance smacks strongly of the former New 
Order structure of the military ruling the civilians. 
Soon after the Dwifungsi doctrine was abolished in 
1998, it was replaced by a set of new paradigms by which 
territorial commanders retain their territorial role for 
improving social conditions and can be used to try to end 
domestic ethnic and religious divides. Broadly interpreted, 
the territorial structure allows the military to continue its 
role ,i n politics and 'guidance' can often mean guidance 
over the village head, sub-district chief or district chief. 
At the village level, the TNI territorial structure is 
represented by a babinsa (village NCO officer) at the sub-
district, a Koramil (sub-district military command) and at 
the district level, a Kodim (district military command) 
structure. In the more remote, conflict-prone places like 
West Papua, the military structures remain dominant. 
Pancasila and the guardian of the state 
Military watchers argue that in the end, it is the 
ideological interpretation of the average TNI officer about 
their military duties that ultimately determines whether 
reform of the TNI has been successful, TNI officers, in 
particular army officers, are more often than not 
convinced of the uniqueness of their role as military. In 
particular military stalwarts who experienced the period 
between 1945 till 1949 are convinced of their 
predominant role in the struggle for independence. 
The two most prominent military men, General Abdul 
Harris Nasution and General Suharto, differ on many 
things but not on the uniqueness of the TNI. As they see 
it, the TNI cannot be compared with other armies in the 
developed world, and for that reason TNI has is own 
doctrines, strategies and tactics. 
In the Nasution days, pre-1965, distrust towards 
civilian politicians was prominent and this distrust 
continues to this very day. In the Suharto days, especially 
in the 1980s, the Pancasi/a teaching of Sukarno was 
promoted from a loose kind of guidance into a strict 
ideology whereby unity and common thinking became 
prevalent. The TNI became the guardian of that principle. 
Whenever state unity was under threat, the TNI was 
obliged to step in on the assumption that it could not rely 
on the policies of a civilian government. 
The present batch of officers have accepted in principle 
the new paradigm of civilian supremacy. At the same time 
they were groomed in the spirit and ideology of the New 
Order. Some pessimistic military watchers state that we 
will have to wait at least another decade for a new 
generation of officers to graduate from the military 
academy who are not polluted by old totalitarian views. 
continued on page 22 
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West woos SBY 
A procession of Western political 
heavyweights - US Secretary of State, 
Condoleezza Rice, British Prime Minister, 
Tony Blair, and Dutch Prime Minister, Jan 
Peter Balkenende - has made its way to 
Jakarta in recent weeks to strengthen ties 
with the world's largest Muslim country 
now regarded as a stalwart in the war on 
terrorism. To the dismay of campaigners, 
military relations have been high on the 
agenda of the bilateral discussions while 
human rights concerns have been virtually 
ignored. 
Rice's rhetoric 
First in the queue to the Merdeka Palace of President 
Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (SBY) was Secretary Rice on 
14 March. The talks between the two focused on global 
and regional issues, including the war on terror, maritime 
security, and building democracy. 
In a statement issued ahead of Secretary Rice's visit, 
the East Timar and Indonesia Action Network (ETAN) 
urged the US to promote genuine justice, peace and 
human rights. 
It pointed out that 'A forward-looking policy toward 
Indonesia would make clear that democracy requires more 
than fair elections' . And added that 'Secretary Rice should 
change her stance on Indonesia's security forces to make 
genuine accountability and real reform prerequisites for 
military assistance.' 
The rights group accused the US administration of 
'hollow rhetoric' in adopting a so-called 'carefully 
calibrated' approach toward aiding the Indonesian military 
while proposing a greater than six-fold increase in military 
aid to Indonesia for 2007. 
'Secretary Rice abandoned the best available leverage 
to press for genuine reform ... by recklessly waiving 
restrictions on US military assistance to Indonesia late last 
year,' said the group [see TAPOL Bulletin No. 181, p. 21]. 
It urged that benchmarks be established and met before 
the US provides any foreign military financing and lethal 
equipment. 
Following a meeting with Foreign Minister Hasan 
Wirajuda, Secretary Rice confirmed that the 'military-to-
military relationship is again an important element of 
relations between the United States and Indonesia' and 
referred to their excellent cooperation on counter-
terrorism' 
Secretary Rice made no mention of the problems of 
West Papua, but in a statem~nt about Burma redolent 
with irony and double standards she said : 
'Great democracies like Indonesia and like the United 
States cannot turn a blind eye to those who still live under 
oppression, and I know that Indonesia, through the 
President and through the efforts of the Minister as well , 
have been trying to convince the Burmese .. . that it is time 
to join the international community and to respect human 
rights.' 
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Blair's mission 
Hot on Secretary Rice 's heels was Prime Minister Blair on 
30 March with a similar agenda to counter terrorism , 
increase military co-operation and improve relations 
between the West and Islam. 
Blair's attempt to promote an inter-faith dialogue by 
announcing the establishment of an Indonesian-UK 
Islamic Advisory Group was, however, overshadowed, by 
calls by several of those meeting him for Britain to 
withdraw its troops from Iraq. 
In a joint statement, Blair - the first British Prime 
Minister to visit Indonesia for over 20 years - and SBY 
welcomed an Indonesia-UK Memorandum of 
Understanding on police cooperation and the launch of 'a 
new modern defence and security relationship to address 
contemporary challenges, from co-operation on counter-
terrorism and maritime security to UK support for 
Indonesia's security sector reform process' . 
The meaning of this new 'defence and security 
relationship' is not yet clear since Britain and Indonesia 
already enjoy unrestricted military ties. Britain has been 
one of Indonesia's largest arms suppliers for many years 
and in 2005 licensed over £12.5 million of arms exports, 
ranging from gun silencers to combat aircraft parts .. 
In statement, TAPOL said that the main beneficiaries 
of the two countries' plan to strengthen military and anti-
terror ties will be the Indonesian security forces, which are 
still the main perpetrators of terror in the country. 'The 
political endorsement of their role will serve as a 
disincentive for urgently-needed reform,' it added [press 
release, 31 March 2006] 
TAPOL argued in its statement that the military is the 
main stumbling block in the way of Indonesia's transition 
to genuine democracy despite the democratic advances 
made since the downfall of Suharto and the achievement 
of peace in Aceh . It remains a powerful institution largely 
unaccountable to the civilian authorities and over-reliant 
on legal and illegal business activities for the bulk of its 
income. It refuses to abandon its territorial command 
structure, which is regarded as a lucrative money-making 
machine particularly in resource-rich areas such as Papua. 
Blair made a routine statement in support of 
Indonesia's territorial integrity and expressed the UK's 
'support for dialogue to settle internal differences on 
Papua.' However, an attempt to question him about West 
Papua was rebuffed with the response that Britain is 
committed to supporting the democratic process in 
Indonesia. A letter from TAPOL urging the Prime Minister 
to address human rights concerns in West Papua in his 
meeting with SBY apparently did not have the desired 
result (see http://tapol.gn.apc.orglnews/ 
fi/es!/eto60326.htm). 
Dutch PM supports Papua's integration 
Predictably, the tune did not change with the visit of 
Dutch Prime Minister, Jan Peter Balkenende on 7 April. 
The leader of the former colonial power reaffirmed his 
government's commitment to Indonesia's territorial 
integrity despite his country's policy of separating West 
Papua at the time of Indonesia's independence in 1949. 
Like the previous visitors, Balkenende met with Islamic 
leaders and called for increased interfaith dialogue. 
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The truth is told 
jfrom the stories of our sisters and 
brothers we learn that victory is not a 
simple matter of heroes and villains; that 
history is more than the listing of major 
events or the biographies of those who are 
called leaders. The experiences of 
uordinary people", both the many who 
died and those who survived, tel us where 
we have come from and help us 
understand who we are today. From their 
stories we see more clearly both the 
extremes of human dignity and of human 
degradation that were manifested in our 
country during these 2 5 years. We must 
learn from both sides of this human story. 
We must acknowledge our potential for 
both extremes, and strive always to bring 
the best of our humanity into our lives and 
relationships-our famihes, our 
communities and our nation-each day as 
we build a new future' [CAVR Report, 
Introduction] 
One of the objectives of East Timor's Commission for 
Reception, Truth and Reconciliation (known by its 
Portuguese acronym, CAVR) was 'to demonstrate the 
immense damage done to individuals and communities 
when power is used with impunity'. 
The Commission's 2500-page report, publicly available 
since January, leaves no room for doubt on that score. It 
is a devastating indictment of the Government of 
Indonesia and the Indonesian security forces up to the 
highest level. 
Widespread and systematic violations 
Throughout the period of the illegal military occupation of 
East Timor, the Indonesian security forces committed 
'massive, widespread and systematic human rights 
violations against the civilian population,' says the report. 
The litany of crimes included unlawful killings, 
enforced disappearances, forced displacements, arbitrary 
detentions, torture and ill-treatment, crimes of sexual 
violence, sexual slavery and violations of the rights of the 
child. 
These amounted to war crimes and crimes against 
humanity. Violations of international humanitarian law or 
the laws of war included breaches of the Geneva 
Conventions on the protection of civHians, the use of 
napalm and other incendiary devices on civilian targets, 
and the destruction of property and food sources. 
Although the vast majority of violations were 
perpetrated by the Indonesian security forces, serious 
violations were also committed by East Timor's two main 
political associations Fretilin (the left-wing Revolutionary 
Front for an Independent East Timor) and UDT (the 
centre-right Timorese Democratic Union) during political 
conflicts in 1974-76 and as a result of internal conflicts 
within the Fretilin resistance in 1975-77. 
A brief civil war involving UDT and Fretilin in 1975 
claimed up to 3,000 lives. However, Indonesia's 
increasingly overt interference in the territory's affairs was 
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A home destroyed by militia violence following the 
August 1999 independence referendum. 
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found by the Commission to be a major contributor to the 
deterioration of the volatile situation which then existed. 
The Commission estimates that the minimum number 
of conflict-related deaths was 102,800. That includes an 
estimated 18,600 total killings by all sides and an 
estimated 84,200 deaths due to hunger and illness, 
although the latter figure could be as high as 183 ,000. 
Tens of thousands of Timorese were arbitrarily 
detained and thousands were subjected to torture, ill-
treatment and serious sexual violations. 
A defining feature of the conflict was the 
displacement suffered by almost every East Timorese 
person. This resulted in deprivation of various kinds, 
including hunger, disease and the loss of adequate shelter. 
Many Timorese suffered from a terrible famine in the 
late 1970s and early 1980s as a consequence of the 
Indonesian strategy of separating the civilian population 
from the armed resistance and holding tens of thousands 
of surrendered civilians in detention camps and 
resettlement villages. Displacement rendered those 
affected vulnerable to numerous other human rights 
violations. 
A range of economic and social rights were also 
comprehensively violated both as a by-product of military 
operations and a consequence of the unchecked pursuit of 
commercial interests by military and civilian officials. 
Education was used as a propaganda tool rather than to 
meet basic learning needs. 
Promoting reconciliation 
One of the Commission's key functions was to promote 
reconciliation in East Timor itself. Its main reconciliation 
initiative at the grassroots level was the Community 
Reconciliation Process (CRP). This voluntary mechanism 
combined practices of traditional justice, arbitration, 
mediation and aspects of both criminal and civil law. 
Before a hearing could be conducted the Office of the 
General Prosecutor (OGP) was required to consider and 
retain those cases involving possible serious criminal 
offences. A total of 1 ,371 perpetrators successfully 
completed a CRP and the process appears to have made a 
real contribution to community reconciliation and to 
ending the suffering of many victims. 
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However, it is very much unf inished business. A 
substantial body of cases has not been processed in any 
way and the (OGP) has not taken any further action on 
the cases it retained. The limitations of East Timor's 
Serious Crimes Unit (SCU), its restriction to crimes 
committed in 1999, and the failure of the Indonesian 
judicial process to provide any semblance of justice mean 
that the vast majority of human rights violations have yet 
to be dealt with in any fashion . 
'The fact that many perpetrators have voluntarily 
participated in the painful and often humiliating 
experience of a CRP hearing, while those guilty of more 
serious crimes seem unlikely ever to be held to account, 
has produced a situation of unequal accountability and a 
perceived justice deficit,' says the Commission . 
Confronting impunity 
The Commission notes that the international community 
witnessed and demonstrated its horror at the crimes 
committed during 1999 before and after the UN-
administered Popular Consultation, but says that those 
crimes were far outweighed by those committed during 
the previous 24 years of occupation. Regrettably, the 
international community has paid little attention to the 
issue of justice for the whole of the preceding period. 
That has resulted in the entrenchment of impunity, 
says the Commission : 'Those who planned , ordered , 
committed and are responsible for the most serious 
human rights violations have not been brought to 
account, and in many cases have seen their military and 
civil careers flourish as a result of their activities.' 
Futhermore, Indonesia has never shown a genuine will to 
bring the perpetrators to book. 
The Commission recommends that the Government of 
Indonesia tables the report in the Indonesian Parliament, 
and in order to foster a spirit of reconciliation, apologises 
to the victims for the violations committed during the 
occupation . 
While acknowledging that the issue of justice for the 
conflict and occupation period is difficult and complex, the 
Commission insists that the international community must 
ultimately take responsibility. 
It recommends the renewal of the mandates of the 
SCU and Special Panels in East Timor and says the SCU 
should investigate a number of exemplary cases. It 
provides a list of institutions of the armed forces and 
persons in positions of command responsibility, which it 
says should be the subject of focused investigation and 
prosecution by the Indonesian authorities. It calls for 
Indonesia to transfer those already indicted to the 
renewed Panels. 
In the event that these measures fail to deliver a 
sufficient measure of justice and Indonesia persists in the 
obstruction of justice, the United Nations should be 
prepared to institute an international tribunal, says the 
Commission. 
The Commission also the highlights the importance of 
reparations for the most vulnerable victims of human 
rights violations. It recommends the implementation of a 
reparations programme with Indonesia bearing the 
greatest proportion of the costs. Other countries -
especially the members of the UN Security Council - and 
business corporations who support the illegal occupation 
and thus indirectly allowed violations to take place, are 
obliged to contribute, it says. 
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CAVR on TAPOL 
Tapol was established in June 1973 and carried regular 
reports on Timor-Leste from1974. After BCIET became 
defunct, Tapol helped keep the issue alive in Britain .. . 
Tapol campaigned primarily through the publication of 
its newsletter, whose regularity, longevity and 
professionalism was the envy of other activists, and 
whose distinctive contribution was its reportage based 
on Indonesian sources. Tapol and its newsletter owed 
much to the initiative and dedication of Carmel 
Budiardjo, herself a former political prisoner in 
Indonesia, and Liem Soei Liong, an Indonesian living in 
exile in the Netherlands. They reached a wide 
international network through the newsletter and 
speaking tours abroad, including later to the UN. They 
also built a solid support network in Britain comprising 
a cross section of distinguished patrons, including 
dignitaries like Lord Avebury who was a persuasive 
advocate for Timor-Leste in many elite circles 
throughout Timor-Leste's struggle 
CAVR report Part 7, para 444. 
Self-determination, the international dimension, 
and the UK 
The right to self-determination was fundamental to East 
Timor's fate as a small and vulnerable nation, says the 
Commission. Recognition by the UN that East Timor was 
a non-self-governing territory with the right to self-
determination 'gave the issue an international legal basis 
which became the principal asset of the people ... in their 
unequal struggle for independence' . 
Despite that, western countries' approach to the 
problem was determined largely by strategic and 
economic interests in relation to Indonesia. They paid 
only obeisance to moral and legal principles. 
The Commission concludes that whereas the UK 
government acknowledged the right of the people of East 
Timor to self-determination, it chose to stay silent on the 
issue. It did not intervene to halt the 1975 invasion 
although it knew of Indonesia's intentions. Instead it took 
the view that 'it is in Britain's interests that Indonesia 
should absorb the territory as soon as and as 
unobtrusively as possible: and that if it comes to the 
crunch and there is a row in the United Nations, we 
should keep our heads down and avoid siding against the 
Indonesian government' . 
The UK failed to promote the right to self-
determination or provide assistance to the Timorese 
struggle until 1998. On the contrary, it actively supported 
Indonesia's campaign by advising Indonesian officials on 
the management of the issue and on 'how to handle 
reports of atrocities'. 
'Britain 's decision to keep "our heads down" was 
largely dictated by the importance it attached to its long-
standing commercial interests in Indonesia' , says the 
Commission . During the occupat ion, the UK increased 
aid, trade and military co-operation with Indonesia. 
The Commission notes that the UK was a major 
supplier of arms to Indonesia during the occupation and 
that senior Indonesian mil itary officials were given training 
in British mil itary establishments. It cites credible reports 
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that British equipment was used in East Timor, but makes 
the important point that: 
'Whether or not British-made military equipment was 
used in specific violations in Timor-Leste, the provision of 
military assistance helped Indonesia upgrade its military 
capability and freed up the potential for the Indonesian 
armed forces to use other equipment in Timor-Leste. More 
importantly, the provision of military aid to Indonesia by a 
major Western power and member of the Security Council 
was a signal of substantial political support to the 
aggressor in the conflict, and outraged and bewildered 
East Timorese who knew of Britain's professed support for 
self-determination.' 
Recommendations to the UK 
The Commission makes a number of important 
recommendations to the UK government: 
•The UK, as a state that had a military co-operation 
programme with the Indonesian government, 
apologises to the people of East Timor for failing to 
adequately uphold internationally agreed fundamental 
rights and freedoms. 
•The UK, as a state that gave military backing to 
Indonesia and a permanent member of the Security 
Council duty bound to uphold the highest principles of 
world order and peace and to protect the weak and 
vulnerable, assists the government of East Timor in 
providing reparations to victims of human rights 
violations suffered during the Indonesian occupation. 
•Business corporations which profited from the sale of 
weapons to Indonesia during the occupation 
contribute to the reparations programme. 
•The UK, along with all UN member states, refuses a 
visa to any Indonesian military officer named in the 
report for either violations or command responsibil1ity 
for troops accused of violations and takes other 
measures such as the freezing of bank accounts until 
that individual's innocence has been independently 
and credibly established. 
•The UK, along with all other states, regulates military 
sales and cooperation with Indonesia more effectively 
and makes such support totally conditional on progress 
towards fu.11 democratisation, the subordination of the 
military to the rule of law and civilian government, and 
strict adherence with international human rights, 
including respect for the right of self-determination. 
•The UK undertakes a joint initiative with the 
governments of Australia and New Zealand to 
establish the truth about the deaths of the six foreign 
journalists in East Timor in 1975 so that the facts and 
accountability are finally established. 
The UK government has not yet responded to the 
Commission 's findings and recommendations despite 
being urged to do so by TAPOL and others. 
Resistance and international solidarity 
The most important factor in achieving self-determination, 
says the Commission, was the diplomacy of the East 
Timorese resistance. Despite overwhelming odds and 
extraordinary challenges, it was ultimately successful 
because 'it focused on internationally agreed principles, 
eschewed ideology and violence, was open to the 
contribution of all East Timorese, and made maximum use 
of the international system, media and civil society 
networks.' 
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'As a human rights and moral (rather than ideological) 
issue, the question of Timor-Leste gained international 
legitimacy and support at the expense of Indonesia whose 
case rested on force and had no basis in international law 
or morality.' 
In their endeavours, the resistance and the East 
Timorese people were accompanied in 'every step of their 
long journey to freedom' by international civil society 
whose efforts are commonly ignored by official sources. 
The Commission recounts the role of civil society and pays 
special tribute to Indonesian civil society, whose 
involvement in the struggle demanded 'exceptional 
courage', it says. 
No sign of justice 
There is little sign that the major powers and international 
bodies which stayed silent during the occupation have 
learned their lessons and are anxious to make amends. 
Furthermore, the East Timorese leadership has 
regrettably succumbed to the demands of realpolitik. It 
has decided to prioritise good relations with Indonesia 
over the pursuit of justice instead of finding ways of 
accommodating the two objectives. Indonesia has 
cynically taken advantage of the unequal relationship that 
exists between the two countries. 
East Timor's President Gusmao voiced strong criticism 
of the report when presenting it to parliament on 28 
November. The report has still not been formally 
published although it has been available on line since the 
end of January. It has been presented to interested 
governments and donors and some international and local 
NGOs. A six-month community dissemination 
programme in East Timor has been promised. 
The report was presented by President Gusmao to the 
UN Secretary-Genera,I Kofi Annan on 20 January. 
However, it has not yet been referred to the Security 
Council, which retains the overall responsibility for justice. 
A report by the Secretary-General on justice and 
reconciliation - requested by the Security Council last 
September following the publication UN Commission of 
Experts report on accountability for 1999 crimes - is also 
still awaited [See TAPOL Bulletin, No. 181 p. 16 and No. 
179, p. 11]. 
TAPOL and a number of East Timorese, Indonesian 
and international NGOs have written to the Secretary-
General urging him to disseminate the CAVR report to the 
wider UN community and to ensure that it is taken into 
account by the Security Council in its deliberations. 
The Indonesian government has publicly ignored the 
findings of the report. At a meeting in Bali on 17 
February with East Timor's President Gusmao, President 
Yudhoyono dismissed the report as a domestic matter for 
East Timor [see separate article, 'Obrigado!']. 
Earlier, Indonesia pointedly postponed a planned 
meeting in Jakarta because of publicity surrounding the 
East Timorese leader's presentation of the report to the 
UN Secretary-General. 
At the Bali meeting, the two leaders reiterated their 
support for the much maligned Commission of Truth and 
Friendship. The body was set up last year purportedly as 
a bilateral truth-seeking mechanism to review the crimes 
of 1999. It lacks popular support in East Timor and has 
been widely criticised for contradicting international 
standards on the denial of impunity for serious crimes. 
continued on page 24 
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•obrigado! r 
Two heads of state recently agreed to 
forget a terrible past so as to be able to 
consolidate their friendship. Susilo 
Bambang Yudhoyono and Xanana Gusmao 
met in Bali to discuss a report recently 
submitted to the UN Secretary General 
about Indonesia. 
Jakarta politicians and nationalists were furious about this 
while President SBY politely turned down a visit to Jakarta 
by Xanana. They thought Xanana was planning to 
forward a complaint against Indonesia to the UN. Fadli 
Zon, a close buddy of General Prabowo, complained: 
'Timor depended on Indonesia for everything but they 
have no sense of gratitude,' he said . This reminds me of 
the time when the TimTim referendum was held in 
September 1999. Just imagine how amazed I was to hear 
someone on a Jakarta television programme say, following 
the announcement of the pro-independence results: 
'TimTim does not know how to say, thank you.' 
Is it not a fact that during the days of Indonesia's 
struggle for independence in the 1940s, the Dutch 
political elite also accused the Indonesians of being 
ungrateful? And last year, detik.com said that the 
Acehnese don't know the meaning of 'thank you', that 
the expression does not exist in the Acehnese language. 
But hold on! In Aceh, 'thank you' is used to give praise 
to God which is why both sides, those being thankful and 
those being thanked, use the expression 'Alhamdulillah' . 
Both sides give thanks to God which means that there is 
no equivalent phrase in Acehnese. In former days, the 
Dutch also thought that Indonesians should be grateful. 
When Dutch men and women were released from 
Japanese prisons in the 1940s, they were shocked to 
discover that an independence struggle was underway 
and called the natives 'ungrateful'. 
Today the same thing is happening in Indonesia with 
regard to TimTim. Timor Leste which for such a long time 
was torn apart by colonial paternalism, should have been 
grateful to Portugal and the Church. 'Obrigado' (thank 
you) was the way they saw it. So now, centuries later, the 
people of Timor Leste are being reprimanded for not 
being grateful or in other words not seeing colonialism as 
a blessing. And moreover - no less important - the lack of 
an expression for 'thank you' does not mean that a nation 
does not have the capacity to feel grateful. To regard 
other nations as immoral is an abuse, a form of racism. 
Neo-colonial oppression 
These examples show how those in power and the reality 
of neo-colonial oppression can distort people's perceptions 
of other people, as with the Indonesian press in the case 
of Timor Leste. It seems that neo-colonial sentiment has 
entered our mindset, the very way we think. The 
complexities of a former colonised nation have been 
replaced by the complexities of a former coloniser. 
So, what has happened? Timor Leste, especially 
President Xanana and Foreign Minister Jose Ramos Horta, 
had no intention of cornering Indonesia by filing a 
complaint to the UN. It was the UN and the Timor Leste 
Parliament which instructed the Timor reconciliation 
commission to conduct a major investigation into the 
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human rights abuses perpetrated by Indonesians and East 
Timorese from 1974 to 1999. The commission , known as 
CAVR, has now completed its report after interviewing 
eight thousand people; their investigations went on for 
three years. 
For Indonesia it was a matter for regret, while 
President Xanana was angry because the CAVR report 
recommended that the Timor Leste government should 
call for an international tribunal and demand 
compensation for Timorese human rights victims. 
Whatever he may have felt, Xanana was required by law 
to present the report to the UN Secretary General. 
We know very well that the Timorese people as well as 
their government, including President Xanana and Foreign 
Minister Ramos Horta, in their hearts of hearts, certainly 
want justice for the victims of one of the worst human 
rights disasters ever to have happened in Asia. But we also 
know that the Dili government realises that in today's 
world, justice is for those who win wars. All international 
tribunals since Nuremberg, Tokyo and Rwanda, and the 
former Yugoslavia took place thanks to strong pressure 
from, and the agreement of, the super powers which had 
won these wars. 
The TimTim dispute was settled at the negotiating 
table with no victors, but the majors powers who sit on 
the UN Security Council had no interest in there being a 
tribunal for Timor Leste. During the entire period of the 
Timor Leste conflict, from 1974 till 1999, realpolitik 
meant that Indonesia was more important than Timor 
Leste. If Timor Leste had called for a tribunal, it would 
have been strongly resisted by Indonesia. 
Burying the past 
Timor Leste's position is quite understandable, yet even 
so, Jakarta politicians were infuriated, that when the two 
leaders met, they agreed to bury the past. The generals 
who were responsible for the 180,000 victims have 
escaped justice. The generals and war criminals of Serbia 
were less fortunate because their country is located in 
Europe and their civil war took place on the fringes of 
Europe. The Indonesian generals who escaped justice can 
consider themselves lucky because their country does not 
impinge on the interests of the superpowers. As the 
beneficiaries of impunity, Indonesian politicians and 
soldiers should say 'Obrigado' to Timor Leste ... 
Indonesia should understand the position it is now in, 
and should respect the dignity and sacrifices of a 
neighbouring country by acknowledging the facts 
contained in the CAVR report. As CAVR was set up by the 
UN, Indonesia and Timor Leste should call on the 
international community, and specifically on the UN, to set 
up an international tribunal or a hybrid tribunal as in 
Cambodia to deal with those responsible for human rights 
crimes in Timor Leste. It is up to the UN to make a move. 
Civil society in Europe, Indonesia and Timor Leste must 
now act. 
To my readers, let me say: 'Obrigado!' 
This article was written by Aboeprijadi Santoso of 
Radio Netherlands 
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Workers' rights under renewed 
threat? 
Indonesian workers have benefited from 
significant improvements in their working 
conditions and ability to organise since the 
end of the repressive Suharto regime, but 
recent anti-union actions have served as a 
reminder that serious violations of labour 
rights still occur. British commercial 
interests represented by Unilever and 
Group 4 Securicor (G4S) have come under 
particular scrutiny. On a more positive 
note, the government has delayed 
introducing a controversial new labour law 
which threatened to reduce 
employees'benefits for the sake of 
industrial competitiveness. 
Musim Mas union leaders jailed 
In a case which has led to a high-profile campaign by the 
international food-workers union, IUF [see endnote], six 
union leaders at the giant PT Musim Mas oil palm 
plantation and processing plant at Pelalawan, Riau 
province, Sumatra were jailed for up to two years earlier 
this year. The six men had been in custody since their 
arrest following a strike and demonstration at the 
company in September 2005. The IUF believes the men 
were selectively targeted for prosecution because of their 
union activities. 
According to the IUF, the conviction of the union 
leaders was the culmination of a series of violations of 
workers' rights by PT Musim Mas. The company refused 
to recognise the legally-registered union, Kahutindo, -
which was formed in October 2004 and represents 1, 183 
workers out of a total workforce of roughly 2,000 - or 
negotiate with Kahutindo on the implementation of 
minimum working standards required under Indonesian 
law. 
Following the arrest of the union officers, the company 
sacked the 701 permanently-employed union members 
who took part in the strike and refused to renew the 
contracts of an additional 300 unionised contract workers. 
In December, it forcibly evicted the 701 dismissed workers 
and their families from their plantation housing and 
expelled their children from school. 
The strike and demonstration in September were 
organised in response to the dismissal of Kahutindo 
chairperson, Robin Kimbi and the company's failure to 
implement minimum labour standards endorsed by the 
local Parliament and Department of Manpower. During 
the demonstration, a gate to the Musim Mas refinery was 
pushed over and two persons received minor injuries. 
Despite the fact that 1,000 workers were involved in the 
action, just the six union leaders were arrested and 
prosecuted . 
The IUF alleges that the company orchestrated the 
arrest and prosecution of the key union officers in order to 
destroy the union . 
The men were charged with collective violence against 
property or persons under Article 170 of the Indonesian 
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Musim Mas union leaders, Akhen Pane, Robin 
Kimbi, Masry Sebayang 
criminal code. The IUF points out that at no point in his 
submissions did the prosecutor allege that the actions of 
the union leaders and their actions alone led to the 
incident with the refinery gate. Despite that, Robin Kimbi 
and Kahutindo regional secretary, Masry Sebayang, were 
convicted and sentenced to two years imprisonment. 
Union leaders Suyahman, Safrudin, Akhen Pane and 
Sruhas Towo were each sentenced to 14 months 
imprisonment. The six men, who are appealing against 
their convictions, are being investigated by Amnesty 
International as possible prisoners of conscience. 
Following its visit to Indonesia in 1999, the UN 
Working Group on Arbitrary Detentions noted that the 
provisions of the criminal code on crimes against public 
order, which include Article 170, are 'drafted in such 
general and vague terms that they can be used arbitrarily 
to restrict the freedoms of opinion, expression, association 
and assembly' and can be used 'to target the press, 
peaceful political opposition activities and trade unions ... ' 
[WGAD report, p. 7]. 
The men could have been charged with property 
damage under Article 406, which is not a public order 
offence and carries a lesser sentence. The decision to deal 
with a private industrial dispute under public order penal 
provisions is evidence, says the IUF, of the political nature 
of the charges. 
The IUF also points out that the speed of the 
prosecutions stands in stark contrast to the authorities' 
refusal to investigate the union's report of injuries 
sustained by two workers only the day before the gate 
incident when a company truck driven by its chief of 
security drove into the mass of demonstrators. 
Furthermore the court failed to compel a director of 
Musim Mas to attend the trials and give evidence which 
could have assisted the six accused. 
A motion tabled in the UK parliament in January 
calling for the prisoners to be released and for the sacked 
workers to be reinstated has been signed by 47 MPs 
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[Early Day Motion 1520: Indonesian 
Palm Oil Workers]. 
Unilever urged to respond 
Musim Mas operates the world's 
largest palm oil refinery and 
through its Malaysian marketing 
office, Musim Mastika, supplies the 
European processed food, personal 
care and soaps/detergent industries 
with a significant proportion of the 
palm oil products which are 
essential to a wide range of 
manufacturing processes. 
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The Ango-Dutch multinational, 
Unilever, is the world's third largest 
food company with products 
ranging from Hellmann's 
mayonnaise and Flora margerine to 
Magnum ice creams, Persil washing 
powder and Dove and Sunsilk 
personal products. Many of these 
products contain palm oil or palm 
oil derived chemicals. 
Musim Mas prisoners in conference with lawyers 
The Unilever European Works Council (UEWC), which 
represents 52,000 employees, has said in a letter to 
Unilever CEO Patrick Cescau dated 15 March, that it 
believes Unilever is using Musim Mas products and, 
therefore, sanctioning the company's 'abhorrent practices' . 
It calls the use of tainted Musim Mas ingredients 
'unacceptable' and urges the company to convey its 
concern to Musim Mas. 
The UEWC letter concludes: 'If it is Unilever's position 
that the company does not use Musim Mas products in 
any way, it is incumbent upon Unilever to publicly clarify 
its palm oil sourcing and open the process to independent 
scrutiny. Unilever employees, consumers, and all those 
concerned with human rights and responsible business 
practices can accept no less.' 
The UEWC also points out that Unilever is closely 
associated with Musim Mas through the Roundtable on 
Sustainable Palm Oil (RSPO), which brings together palm 
oil producers, users, retailers and NGOs. Musim Mas is a 
member of RSPO and Unilever's Sustainable Agriculture 
Manager, Jan Kees Vis, is its Executive President. 
Prominent UK companies, such as the Body Shop and 
Cadbury-Schweppes, are also on the RSPO Executive 
Board and have supported Musim Mas. In a letter to the 
IUF, the Body Shop said: 'PT Musim Mas .. . may or may 
not be currently be complying with the full set of [the 
RSPO's Principles and Criteria for Sustainable Palm Oil], 
but if we were to exclude companies from participating 
due to current practices we would be going against our 
policy of constructive engagement. .. '. Oxfam GB, 
another RSPO Board Member, has not yet made its 
position clear. 
More information is available at www.iuf.org/den3255 
and via links from the IUF home page. 
Military intervenes in G4S dispute 
Meanwhile, disturbing reports have emerged of military 
intervention in a dispute involving the security company, 
Group 4 Securicor. 
In an apparent attempt to intimidate the Securicor 
Indonesia Union and drive down labour standards, the 
company has dismissed over 200 of 259 striking 
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employees and embarked on campaign of harassment 
against union leaders. It has also failed to comply with 
the decisions of an industrial tribunal and the Indonesian 
High Court. 
The dispute arose following the merger of Securicor 
and Group 4 in 2004 when the company's Indonesian 
arm, PT Securicor Indonesia, refused to negotiate with 
union representatives over terms and conditions for 
employees in the new enterprise. 
After three unsuccessful attempts at negotiations, the 
union organised a lawful strike in protest at the company's 
behaviour. The company's response was to sack over 200 
employees and, with the assistance of the police, attempt 
to intimidate union members into ending their strike. 
Union leaders have complained of death threats and 
coercive phone calls to family members. 
And in a move with worrying echoes of Suharto-era 
repressive practices, last July the company called in 
military personnel to prevent union officials from entering 
its Jakarta office over a two-week period. Scuffles 
ensued, but there were no reports of injuries. Retired 
naval officers who manage the offices have also made 
threats to union demonstrators. 
Also last July, ten union officials were ordered to 
appear at the South Jakarta police office for interrogation. 
Three of the men, Union President, Fitrijansjah Toisutta, 
and members, Tri Muryanto, and Edi Putra, were named 
as suspects for the crime of committing 'unpleasant acts' 
against the company. The trial of Fitrijansjah Toisutta 
began in December but has since been adjourned. 
Mr Toisutta claims that the criminal charge was used to 
pressure him into signing an agreement not to block the 
company's loading dock when protesting. The company 
has repeatedly used threats of civil and criminal actions to 
intimidate workers and strikers. In one letter to all 
employees, the company said it was videotaping 
demonstrations and accused the union of blackmail. 
Despite a recommendation by the local Office of 
Manpower and a ruling by Indonesia's National Dispute 
Resolution Committee (P4P) that the sacked workers 
should be reinstated and an unsuccessful appeal by the 
company to the High Court for State Administrative 
Affairs, the company has refused to meet its legal 
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obligations. Its appeal to the Supreme Court is pending, 
but in the meantime the sacked employees remain out of 
work. 
The company has also refused to pay the striking 
workers' wages as required by Indonesian law despite a 
ruling by the Central Jakarta State Court that it should do 
so. 
The dispute is now the subject of an international 
campaign initiated by the Securicor Indonesia union and 
the Association of Indonesian Trade Unions (ASPEK). It is 
supported by the US-based Service Employees 
International Union (SEIU). TAPOL met with officials of 
these organisations on their way to Geneva in March to 
submit a complaint to the International Labour 
Organisation (ILO). 
The complaint, which will be considered by the ILO's 
Committee on Freedom of Association, alleges breaches 
by Indonesia of ILO Convnentions 87 (Freedom of 
Association and Protection of the Right to Organise) and 
98 (Right to Organise and Collective Bargaining). 
The union officials also delivered a petition to the 
General Secretary of the Labour Party, which uses G4S for 
its conferences and other public events. 
For more information see 
www. focusongrou p4secu ricer.com 
Poverty wages 
G4S workers have also complained that the company is 
not paying length-of-service increments to the minimum 
wage. In 2005, the minimum wage for Jakarta was Rp 
711,500 (approx. US$ 80) per month. Employees with 
more than one year's service are entitled to an increment, 
but that is not being paid in many cases. 
The minimum wage is in itself a pittance and hardly 
adequate for basic survival. Low-paid Indonesian workers 
are particularly vulnerable to exploitation and TAPOL 
believes British companies such as Group 4 Securicor, 
which derive substantial profits from their operations in 
Indonesia, should be ashamed of paying wages, which 
reinforce the poverty of their employees. 
Government backs down over new Labour ,law 
In a contrasting sign that the democratic changes in 
,Indonesia have brought some benefit to the labour 
movement, the government was forced by a wave of 
publ.ic protests at the beginning of April to put off the 
revision of a labour law aimed at boosting the country's 
investment climate. 
Thousands of workers demonstrated on the streets of 
Jakarta and cities across Java against the proposed 
changes to a 2003 law, which affords a degree of 
protection to workers' rights. 
The changes would have resulted in a 50 per cent 
reduction in severance pay and allowed companies to hire 
workers for up to five years without a contract. It would 
also have imposed stricter conditions for negotiations on 
the minimum wage. 
The government and business community took the 
view that the 2003 law was too generous to workers and 
more flexibility was required to improve Indonesia's 
economic performance and make it more attractive to 
foreign investors. 
On 8 April, President Yudhoyono, in response to the 
public outcry, announced that the revised law would not 
be submitted to Parliament as scheduled. It would first be 
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considered by a tripartite forum of employers' 
associations, workers' groups and government officials. 
Undoubtedly, the protests and negotiations over the 
law would not have been allowed to happen under the 
Suharto regime when workers were ruthlessly oppressed, 
but it remains to be seen what form the law will 
eventually take and whether a genuine accommodation 
between the government, employers and workers will be 
achieved. 
Note: 
IUF - International Union of Food, Agricultural, Hotel, 
Restaurant, Catering, Tobacco and Allied Workers' 
Associations 
continued from page 14 
Civilian supremacy 
In theory this may be simple, but realisation is more 
complex . The two keys elements of civilian supremacy are 
democratic control over the military and military 
professionalism. 
Again, in theory, post-Suharto Indonesia fulfils all the 
criteria of a democracy, with an elected government and 
legislature. But in this transitional stage of a young 
democracy, military thinking is still persistent, in particular 
in parliament and within the civil service. 
Most political parties, including the major ones like 
Golkar and PDl-P have many retired officers on their 
boards and also in parliament. The old style of politics, 
the patron-client system remains the dominant structure 
within the parties. In the civil service, many high-ranking 
posts are still occupied by military, and the same is true at 
provincial 1level. 
Civilian politicians often lack the confidence to defy 
the old prevailing structures. The military structure was 
and arguably still is the best organised institutional and 
political force. More often than not, if candidates are 
being nominated for governor or district chief, the 
military candidate will be selected and elected, not least 
because he previously served as military commander 
while civilian candidates are seen as inexperienced. 
As we have already seen, achieving military 
professionalism is a long and winding road. It was not all 
that long ago that a civilian was appointed as minister of 
defence and efforts to place the TNI headquarters fully 
under his department are still in the making. The long 
and the short of it is that TNI reform will take time but 
having a government with a strong political will can 
hasten this process. 
The experience of the Megawati years is clear; they 
were wasted years. The present team - SBY and Yusuf 
Kalla - have started very well with the withdrawal 
(without any significant problems) of the TNI from Aceh. 
The government should be encouraged to continue along 
this line, including by overseeing the demilitarisation of 
West Papua. 
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Anti-pom bill stirs controversy 
A bill which, if passed, would impose 
heavy penalties on women for the way 
they dress or on couples for kissing in 
public has provoked anger and opposition 
m a country that has always prided itself 
on its attachment to the principles of 
pluralism and secularism. It is also seen as 
being an affront to the cultural values and 
traditions of people in Bali and Papua. 
The bill currently under discussion in the Indonesian 
Parliament (DPR) is being promoted primarily by Muslim 
parties. It is regarded by many, especially cultural workers, 
as an attack on personal freedoms, in particu'lar the right 
to freedom of expression. It has met with strong 
opposition from the artistic community and the media and 
has stirred strong emotions particularly in Bali . 
The Anti-Pornography and Pornographic Acts Bill was 
first mooted in 1999 but has lain dormant until recently 
when hardliners began to fear what they see as the 
harmful effects of globalisation. 
The first paragraph of the explanation attached to the 
bill states; ' as religious believers, Indonesians are 
convinced that God forbids anti-social behaviour, such as 
indecency and immorality in our sex lives, for instance 
sexual harassment, adultery, sexual deviation, etc.' [The 
Jakarta Post, 21 March 2006] 
According to the editor-in-chief of Indonesia's leading 
weekly, Tempo, Bambang Harymurti: 'Pornography is a 
red herring. They are not really concerned about 
pornography. They want to control the society so that it 
behaves in a certain way. If you read the draft, it allows 
everyone to enforce this law. I am more concerned with 
the threat of violence,' he said. Another vocal critic of the 
bill, Leo Batubara, deputy head of the Indonesian 
Newspapers Association, said the hardliners were trying 
to turn Indonesia, where most Muslims pride themselves 
as moderates, into Taliban Afghanistan. [The Jakarta Post, 
9 March 2006) 
A member of the Indonesian Ulemas Council, Ma'ruf 
Amin, criticised people who were trying to block the bill 
and described them as 'the liberal-minded who seek 
unlimited freedom'. [The Jakarta Post, 7 March 2006] 
In addition to forbidding pornography the definition of 
which is described by its critics as 'vague', the bill would 
impose prison terms of up to ten years and fines of up to 
Rp 2 billion (US$217 ,503) for kissing in public, for the 
exposure of a woman's 'sensual' body parts and the 
display of 'erotic' works of art. 
Responding to the many warnings that the bill could 
imperil the rights of women, already under pressure from 
the introduction of sharia regulations on dress and public 
conduct in some parts of the country, the State Minister 
for Women's Empowerment, Meutia Hatta Swasono, 
sought to take the sting out of the bill by saying it would 
focus on limiting the distribution of 'obscene' materials 
instead of criminalizing personal conduct, particularly of 
women. Yet such limitations would surely have an impact 
on the media and publications. 
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Demonstration against the anti-porn bill held in 
Jakarta on International Women's Day. The sign 
reads 'My body belongs to me' 
Balinese erupt in anger 
The law is most strongly opposed in Bali for a number of 
reasons. In the first place, some aspects of Balinese 
women's dress could come under scrutiny as being in 
breach of the law. The law could also impinge on the 
behaviour of tourists who wear skimpy clothing on the 
beaches. It comes at a time when the economy in Bali has 
been severely hit by a catastrophic fall in the number of 
tourists, the very lifeblood of the island, as a result of the 
2002 and 2005 terrorist atrocities. 
Speaking at a meeting in Den Pasar on 15 March, the 
governor of Bali, Dewa Made Beratha, told a crowded 
hearing and plenary session of the provincial legislative 
assembly that the law 'might put Balinese cultural heritage 
and sacred religious objects in danger of legal 
prosecution'. One of the most influential community 
figures in Bali, Satria Naradha, chastised some supporters 
of the bill who were spreading the idea that Bali might 
want to secede from Indonesia if the law is adopted. 
A much-respected Balinese scholar, Ketut Sumarta, 
said: 'Previously many of us viewed the bill as a threat to 
our interests, either to our tourist industry or cultural 
freedom. Nowadays, the majority of us see the bill as a 
grave threat to the interests of our nation.' The chair of 
Komponen Rakyat Bali, I Gusti Ngurah Harta, said that 
while the unitary state reflected the founding fathers' 
utmost respect for the nation's socio-cultural landscape, 
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'the bill reflects and promotes the moral and cultu ral 
values of only one group of religious bel iefs' . 
A team of parl iamentarians from Jakarta, on a visit to 
Bali to assess public opinion of the bi ll , were told in no 
uncertain terms that it was quite unacceptable. They were 
met at the airport by dozens of people including local 
punk groups and reggae bands and later by a rally of one 
thousand people. Protestors came from all walks of life, 
community activists, academic and ordinary citizens. One 
of the country's foremost dancers, Rina, took to the stage 
later in the day as songs promoting freedom of expression 
were sung. Among the performers were four female 
dancers, including a bare-breasted older woman . [The 
Jakarta Post , 10 March, 2006] 
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President Yudhoyono is himself listed in the CAVR 
report as the commander of Battalion 744 in East Timor 
between 1986-88, although that is not a period when 
significant violations by that battalion were reported. 
Militia leader's sentence re-doubled 
In a minor welcome development, the Indonesian 
Supreme Court confirmed the one remaining conviction 
for crimes against humanity in East Timor, that of militia 
leader, Eurico Guterres. 
Guterres was initially convicted and sentenced to ten 
years imprisonment by Jakarta's ad hoc human rights 
court but had his sentence halved on appeal. On 13 
March, the Supreme Court reinstated the original 
sentence, the minimum allowed under Indonesian law for 
crimes against humanity. 
At the same time however, the Supreme Court upheld 
the appeal court's decision to overturn the conviction of 
Brig-Gen Noer Muis, a former military commander in East 
Timor. 
The situation remains that, apart from Guterres, all the 
other 17 defendants tried by the ad hoc court, including 
all the Indonesian security forces personnel, have been 
either acquitted or had their convictions quashed on 
appeal. 
CAVR backg.round 
The CAVR was set up as an independent body by the UN 
Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET) in 
2001 and began work in 2002 . 
Its purpose was to inquire into human rights violations 
committed on all sides between 25 April 1974 (when the 
overthrow of the fascist Caetano regime in Portugal set in 
train the events which led to Indonesia's invasion and 
occupation of East Timor) and 25 October 1999 (when 
UNTAET was established to administer the territory) and 
promote reconcil iation between victims and perpetrators. 
The Commission's mandate provided it with three 
main functions: to seek the truth regarding human rights 
violations and establish a truth-telling mechanism for 
victims and perpetrators to describe, acknowledge and 
record past abuses; to facilitate community reconciliation 
in relation to lesser cnimes and mediate between victims 
and perpetrators; and to make recommendations for 
further action on reconciliation and the promotion of 
human rights. 
The Commission took nearly 8,000 statements from 
victims and witnesses and completed its work in October 
last year. 
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Among some religious circles, the tsunami disaster is 
seen as a punishment from God. Hence their 
determination to ensure that sharia law is fully 
implemented . 
Sharia law is gradually being introduced elsewhere in 
Indonesia as well. Seven cities and regencies -- Cianjur, 
Garut, and Tasikmalaya in West Java; Tangerang in 
Banten; and Enrekang, Maras, and Bulukumba in South 
Sulawesi -- through the authority given to them by 
regional autonomy, a.I.ready have bylaws on how women 
should dress and act. 
